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BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
DAVE EBERSOLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Imagine getting 10% for blowing the whistle on Madoff's $50 billion
scam. 'It's a simple thing that will stop a lot of fraud fast."" At first blush
this logic may be very convincing, but whistleblowers are driven by more
than just monetary incentives.2 The emotions of Harry Markopolos, the
whistleblower who tried to expose Bernie Madoff's infamous Ponzi
scheme, are telling:
3
If [Madoffj contacted me and threatened me, I was going to
drive down to New York and take him out. At that point it
would have come down to him or me; it was as simple as
that. The government would have forced me into it by
failing to do its job, and failing to protect me. In that
situation I felt I had no other options. I was going to kill
him.4
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
Special thanks to Professors Paul Rose and Dale Oesterle.
1 Robert Chew, Calling All Whistleblowers! The SEC Wants You, TIME, Feb. 24,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1881318,00.html (quoting
Laura Goldman, a whistleblower who has alerted the SEC to twenty-five cases
leading to SEC fraud charges).
2 Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting
Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2010) (noting that monetary incentives can
sometimes be counterproductive). See, e.g., id. at 1181-82.
3 Assessing the MadoffPonzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 11 th Cong. 102 (2009) [hereinafter Assessing
the MadoffScheme] (statement of Harry Markopolus) (stating that "as early as May
2000, I provided evidence to the SEC's Boston Regional Office that should have
caused an investigation ofMadoff. I re-submitted this evidence with additional
support several times between 2000-2008, a period of nine years. Yet nothing was
done."); see also Ross Kerber, The Whistleblower: Dogged Pursuer of Madoff Way
of Fame, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.boston.com/business/articles/
2009/01/08/the whistleblower/.
4 HARRY MARKOPOLOS, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER
145 (2010). See also Madoff Whistleblower Slams SEC in New Book, DEALBOOK
(Feb. 26, 2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/madoff-whistle-
blower-slams-s-e-c-in-new-book/.
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Are these the words of a man motivated by money? Recent research
shows that many factors incentivize whistleblowers to expose fraud, 5 and
may vary depending on context.6
In the wake of Bernie Madoff's7 and Sir Allen Stanford's 8 widely-
publicized Ponzi schemes, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act9 ("Dodd-Frank") significantly expands upon
existing whistleblower law.'0 By expanding anti-retaliation protection and
monetary incentives, Dodd-Frank is designed to incentivize whistleblowers
to expose securities fraud." One such monetary incentive, a new bounty
program providing a ten to thirty percent bounty to whistleblowers
exposing securities fraud, 2 may be a misguided monetary incentive.'
3
According to former Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
Enforcement Division Director Linda Thomsen, assertions that the new
bounty program will lead to more reliable tips are "unfounded."' 14 Dodd-
Frank's implications bring to light plausible alternatives to whistleblower
reporting for enforcing securities fraud and highlight the importance of
thoughtful business practices.' 5
This Note analyzes the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions and
provides recommendations moving forward. Part II briefly outlines
relevant whistleblower laws to provide context. Part III examines the costs
and benefits of the provisions as they affect government, businesses and
individuals. Part IV assesses prospects for legislative amendment and Part
V analyzes agency implementation issues regarding the SEC's Proposed
Rules. Next, Part VI provides practical guidance for business compliance.
Finally, Part VII offers concluding remarks.
5 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
6 Id. at 1155 (stating that "[o]ur findings suggest that a systematic approach to
regulation must include an understanding of the fit between the adopted law, the
misconduct it addresses, and the individual it aims to incentivize").
7 United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244-46 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
8 Julie Creswell, U.S. Agents Scrutinize Texas Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/business/13stanford.html?r=2&ref=-business.
See also Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Andrew M. Harris, Stanford Committed No
Crimes: Securities Expert Says, BLOOMBERG BUsINESSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/stanford-asks-u-s-judge-to-
dismiss-fraud-charges.html.
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
'0 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110 (2009).
" Id. at 112.
12 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(a).
13 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
14 Edward Wyatt, For Whistle-Blowers, Expanded Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15whistle.htm.
15 See infra Pts.III-VI.
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II. RELEVANT WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS
A. Existing Whistleblower Laws
16
A relatively recent area of law, whistleblower law has evolved partly in
response to financial scandals.' 7 In 1978, the Civil Service Reform Act
("CSRA") established the first statutory cause of action protecting
whistleblowers from employer retaliation. 18  While the CSRA set the
foundation for future whistleblower legislation, its provisions were limited
to protecting federal employees' 9 and had little impact.20
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act of
211989 ("WPA"), which greatly expanded whistleblower protection.
Among other provisions, the WPA created a separate agency to litigate
claims, 22 permitted individuals to file whistleblower claims without
government support in some cases, 23 and permitted courts to shift attorneys'
fees from whistleblower plaintiffs to defendants.24 A contemporary act, the
Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, mandated an SEC
whistleblower bounty program for tips reporting insider trading.25
However, the bounty program has proven to be largely ineffective, making
only seven payments totaling $159,537 since its inception.26
16 For an objective and thorough discussion of the policy and efficiency of
encouraging whistleblowers to report bad conduct, presented in the context of the
False Claims Act, see William Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as
Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 1799,
1821-41 (1996).
" The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act was enacted, in part,
to respond to insider trading scandals, including a scandal at Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 12 (1988). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("SOX") was passed, in part, to respond to corporate scandals at Enron and
Worldcom. STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES xi (2004).
18 S. REP. NO. 100-413, at 2 (1988).
19 Id
20 Id. at 5. Surveys show that the percentage of federal employees reporting known
fraud remained fairly constant in 1980 and 1983. Id. Moreover, the number of
employees failing to report illegal activity due to fear of reprisal had risen. Id.
21 See Bill Summary & Status, 101st Congress, S.20, CRS SUMMARY (Mar. 16,
1989), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dl0 :SN00020:@@@D&summ2=m&; see also S. REP. No. 100-
413, at 2 (1988).
22 Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 1221, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
23 Id. § 1221 (a).
24 Id. § 1221(g)(1).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988).
26 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC's
BOUNTY PROGRAM: REP. No. 474, 5 (Mar. 29, 2010).
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In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") tremendously expanded the
scope of whistleblower protection and also required business controls to
deter and' detect fraud.27  Following corporate scandals at Enron and
Worldcom, 28 SOX extended whistleblower protection beyond federal
employees to employees of publicly held companies.29  Notably,
whistleblower protection for non-government employees effectively
adopted public policy to regulate the public risk associated with private
firm failure.30 In addition, SOX granted whistleblowers the right to file a
claim in federal court if an administrative procedure did not result in a final
order within a statute of limitations.31 SOX also set a low standard for
whistleblowers to acquire statutory protection, requiring only that the
whistleblower have a reasonable belief of fraud.32 Thus, whistleblowers
enjoyed a broad array of federal protection to incentivize securities fraud
reporting prior to Dodd-Frank.33
B. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Reform34
Dodd-Frank expands whistleblower protection and monetary incentives
even further than SOX, partially in response to the Madoff and Stanford
Ponzi schemes.35 Specifically, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions:
Provide a ten to thirty percent bounty for all tips resulting in
SEC 6 or CFTC" enforcement actions with monetary sanctions
greater than $1,000,000, which expands upon the SEC's
existing insider trading bounty program.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); see also CRS Summary, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2003); KOHN ET AL., supra note 17.
28 KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at xii.
29 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. See also KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at xiii.
30 KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at xiv.
31 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). See also KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
32 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A), stating that "[i]f
the Secretary of Labor concludes that there is a reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of subsection (a) has occurred, the Secretary shall accompany the
Secretary's findings with a preliminary order providing the relief prescribed by
paragraph (3)(B)); see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at 6.
3 See KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at 6.
34 For a more thorough discussion of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, see
Drew Harker et al., Whistleblower Incentives and Protections in the Financial
Reform Act, 127 BANKING L.J. 779 (2010).
" S. REP. No. 111-176, at 139-40 (2009).
36 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).37Id. at sec. 748, § 23(b)(1).
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* Provide protection to employees of all subsidiaries and
affiliates of public companies38 and "any individual performing
tasks related to the offering or provision of a consumer
financial product or service. 3 9
" Provide a private right of action in federal court for
whistleblowers regardless of administrative delay.4 °
" Increase the statute of limitations for whistleblower protection
actions to six years following the alleged violation.4 '
Perhaps as a result of being lost in long legislation, which totals over
2000 pages, 42 the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions received relatively
little media attention during Dodd-Frank's deliberation.43  Nonetheless,
media attention has since recognized that Dodd-Frank's whistleblower
provisions will undoubtedly affect fraud reporting and impose costs on
businesses and government agencies. 44
III. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Ideally, additional whistleblower reporting will increase fraud detection
and build public confidence in U.S. capital markets, which in turn will
stimulate investment and economic growth.45 However, it is not certain that
the new whistleblower provisions, especially the bounty program, will
increase the quality of whistleblower reporting and subsequently detect
fraud as intended.46  Early reports do indicate that whistleblower tips have
38 Id. § 929A.
" Id. § 1057(b). Whistleblowers protected under § 1057 may not waive their
statutory rights through arbitration agreements. Id. § 1057(d)(1).4 0 Id. at sec. 922(a), § 2 1F(h)(1)(B)(i). Under SOX, whistleblowers could only
proceed to federal court if they could not obtain a final order from an
administrative hearing within 180 days. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(h)(1)(B)(iii), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).42 Id. In contrast, SOX is only sixty-six pages long. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
43 Richard Renner, CNBC notices whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank Act,
WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (July 27, 2010),
http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2010/07/articles/whistleblowers-tax-
fraud/cnbc-notices-whistleblower-provisions-of-doddfrank-act/.
44 See Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 7, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704855104575470080998966388.
html. See also Sue Reisinger, Firms Face a Sudden Rush of Whistleblower Claims,
LAW.COM (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202471808839&rss=newswire&slreturn= 1
&hbxlogin=l.
41 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2-4 (2009).
46 See infra Pt. III.A. 1.
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significantly increased since Dodd-Frank's enactment,4 7 but time is needed
to assess the quality of these tips. 48 This section discusses Dodd-Frank's
likely impact on whistleblower reporting and associated costs.
A. Dodd-Frank's Benefits: A Closer Look at Reporting Securities Fraud
Dodd-Frank provides both anti-retaliation protection (e.g. direct access
to federal court) and monetary incentives (e.g. the bounty program)
designed to increase whistleblower reporting.49 Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank
does not adequately address existing administrative issues with managing
whistleblower tips. Also, monetary incentives may encourage unreliable
tips if outrage over morally culpable behavior already incentivizes
whistleblowers to voluntarily report actual securities fraud.
1. The Problem: Managing Whistleblower Tips
Better administrative tip management, rather than increased monetary
incentives, is needed to efficiently improve securities law compliance. 50 A
2010 Inspector General Report implicitly recognized as much by offering
many managerial recommendations for improving the SEC's existing
insider trading bounty program.51 Taken in this light, it is not whistleblower
incentives of any type, but rather administrative management that should be
reformed to enforce securities laws.
A recently exposed Ponzi scheme is a prime example of the need for
better administrative tip management and the potential ineffectiveness of
52
monetary incentives. In the case, a trader named Ty Schlobohm obtained
47 Yin Wilczek, SEC Already Receiving Whistleblower Claims; More Coming in
Near Future, Law Firms Say, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
(Sept. 10, 2010). See also Holzer &d Johnson, supra note 44.
48 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44.
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Generally, there are three
distinct types of whistleblower incentives: anti-retaliation laws, affirmative duties
to report and monetary incentives. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1160.
50 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 26.
51 Id
52 There is plentiful anecdotal evidence of the SEC and CFTC mishandling valid
tips about fraud. In the context of the SEC, the SEC mishandled Harry
Markopolos's repeated tips about the MadoffPonzi scheme. An earlier response to
the Markopolos tips would have limited the degree of Madoff's fraud. Moreover,
Markopolos's motive for attempting to expose Madoff's fraud was not a
whistleblower bounty, but rather to create fair competition among hedge funds
competing for business. MARKOPOLOS, supra note 4, at 54. Thus, while better
handling of the Markopolos tip would have been effective, monetary whistleblower
incentives would not have exposed the Madoff scheme because Markopolos
voluntarily provided the tip. Assessing the MadoffScheme, supra note 3, at 2 (Rep.
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information exposing a hedge fund's Ponzi scheme. 3 Mr. Schlobohm's
initial report, however, was ignored by the Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"), which incorrectly concluded that it did not
have jurisdiction over the case. 4 It was not until Mr. Schlobohm reported
the tip to the Department of Justice ("DOJ") that the government began to
act 5 The FBI eventually took the lead in the criminal investigation, and
the DOJ action resulted in guilty pleas of mail fraud and tax evasion.1
6
By contrast, the SEC and CFTC's civil investigation began after the
criminal investigation and is still pending as of October 2010, ironically,
despite a less extensive civil burden of proof than in the criminal context.
5 7
Furthermore, the DOJ investigator stated that "[c]ategorically, at no time
did we interfere with the [SEC/CFTC's] ability to move. 58 Also, it is
doubtful that monetary incentives such as the Dodd-Frank bounty
program 59 would have affected Mr. Schlobohm's behavior. 60 In fact, Mr.
Schlobohm stated that he did not report the fraud to earn a reward and has
even suggested that he might reject any award or give it to the victims of
the fraud.6 '
The successful result of the criminal investigation in Mr. Schlobohm's
case considered in tandem with the slow pace and uncertain results of the
SEC/CFTC civil investigation demonstrates the need for improved SEC and
CFTC administrative efficiency. 62  Had the SEC or CFTC been as
Kanjorski stating that "Mr. Markopolos was justifiably relentless in ringing alarm
bells. Unfortunately, our regulators failed to follow his roadmap and heed his
warnings. As a result, thousands of investors were hurt."). A third example of
mishandling tips, this time in the CFTC context, regards tips about manipulating
silver commodity prices. Susan Pulliam & Carolyn Cui, Act Now, CFTC is Urged,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702303341904575576203310056046.
html.
" Edward Wyatt, Whistle. Then Worry and Wait. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/business/IOwhistle.html?pagewanted = I &_r=
3&emc=etal.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 id.
57 id.
58 id.
59 It is not clear in this case whether the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions are
applicable to this situation because the investigation began prior to Dodd-Frank's
enactment. Id. But see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 924(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
60 Wyatt, supra note 53.
61 Id.
62 One lawyer representing the victims noted "it is inexcusable that the authorities
did not move in more quickly to stop people from investing more money." Id.
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responsive initially as the DOJ and FBI were, the fraud could have been
detected in a timely manner and investors may have saved significant
amounts of money.63  As demonstrated by Mr. Schlobohm's case, it is
apparent that whistleblower incentives cannot be successfully implemented
without the ability to adequately manage whistleblower tips.
2. The Congressional Solution: A Bounty Program
Even if administrative management is sufficient to benefit from
whistleblower incentives, Dodd-Frank's bounty program is an unnecessary
and misguided securities fraud deterrent. In recognizing that legal
incentives are limited by social norms and corporate cultures, 64 regulation
should implement "a fit between the adopted law, the misconduct it
addresses and the individual it aims to incentivize." 65  Specifically,
individuals are more likely to report illegal activity if they are particularly
outraged by morally reprehensible conduct. 66 As such, monetary incentives
are most effective in the context of conduct that is not viewed as morally
reprehensible.67 In other contexts, monetary incentives can be ineffective
or even counterproductive and decrease reporting of illegal activity.68
Against this background, Congressional arguments analogizing the new
SEC bounty program to the IRS's recently reformed bounty program may
be faulty. The two bounty programs may not be analogous because
securities fraud reporting is not necessarily analogous to tax fraud
reporting.69 Tax fraud may not be viewed as morally reprehensible 0
63 Id. The criminal investigation in this case allowed fraud to persist in order to
build enough evidence to bring a successful criminal case. Id. A civil investigation
may not have required as much evidence, brought a civil action sooner and
effectively concluded the investor fraud sooner.
64 Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Behavioral versus Institutional Antecedents of
Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG &
GOVERNANCE 165, 201 (2008).
65 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1155.66 Id. at 1192.67 Id. at 1193-94.
68 Monetary incentives can result in a "crowding out effect," whereby informants
are discouraged from reporting illegal activity because the presence of external
rewards discounts moral incentives and intrinsic motivation to report. Id. at 1178-
81. In the presence of monetary incentives, reporting of illegal activity can be
viewed as a "transaction rather than a charitable act." Id. at 1179.
69 Id. at 1171 (making a positive analogy between the new SEC bounty program
and the recently reformed IRS bounty program). See also Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (legislation
creating the IRS whistleblower bounty program).
70 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1204 (stating that tax fraud is generally not
viewed as morally culpable).
2011 Blowing the Whistle on the 131
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
because it harms diffuse victims indirectly through the government. 7' In
contrast, securities fraud may be viewed as morally reprehensible
72
insomuch as it involves morally culpable conduct directly harming
individual investors who have difficulty collectively defending themselves
against fraud.73 If securities fraud is more likely than tax fraudito involve
morally culpable conduct and enrage potential whistleblowers, potential
whistleblowers are more likely to report securities fraud voluntarily
regardless of any monetary incentive.74
Two prominent cases epitomize the divergent nature of reporting tax
and securities fraud. Bradley Birkenfeld, the whistleblower who exposed
extensive tax fraud at UBS AG, was motivated to report by monetary
incentives.7 5 Originally outraged over a dispute with management, Mr.
Birkenfeld decided to report fraud externally, rather than walk away with a
fortune in ill-gotten gains, due to the prospect of a fifteen to thirty percent
bounty under the IRS bounty program.76 Ironically, Mr. Birkenfeld is now
serving a prison sentence for tax fraud and still seeking a bounty from the
IRS for the amounts recovered as a result of his tip.77 By contrast, Sherron
Watkins exposed the accounting scandal (i.e., securities fraud) at Enron
71 Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth
Amendment, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1163, 1204 n.161 (2009).
72 S. Michael Sirkin, The Deterrence Paradox: How Making Securities Fraud
Class Actions More Difficult for Plaintiffs Will More Strongly Deter Corporate
Fraud, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 307, 307-08 (2009) (stating that strong cases of securities
fraud involve morally culpable conduct). See, e.g., Brent Horton, How Corporate
Lawyers Escape Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process,
60 S.C. L. REv. 149, 162 (2008) (stating that Enron's security fraud was morally
reprehensible).
73 David A. Wilson, Outsider Trading-Morality and the Law of Securities Fraud,
77 GEO. L.J. 181, 215 (1988). See also KOHN, supra note 17, at xv (citing
congressional intent to enact "U.S. laws [that] encourage and protect those who
report fraudulent activity that can damage innocent investors in publicly traded
companies."). Additionally, Kohn notes that pre-SOX securities fraud "caused
investors and pensioners to lose billions of dollars in scandal-plagued companies.
Id. at xii. By citing such congressional intent and noting the effect on individuals,
Kohn recognizes that securities fraud can have a direct effect on individuals. It
should be noted that individual investors sometimes invest through institutional
investors, who presumably provide sophistication and defense against fraud.
74 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1193-95.
75 Michael Bronner, Telling Swiss Secrets: A Banker's Betrayal, GLOBALPOST, at
pt. 4, Aug. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/europe/100724/globalpost-investigation-
telling-swiss-secrets-part-4?page=0,0. See also Ken Stier, Why is the UBS Whistle-
Blower Headed to Prison?, TIME, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1928897,00.html.
76 Bronner, supra note 75, at pt. 4.
77 id.
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Corp., not due to monetary incentives, but rather because she was
concerned about the consequences of Enron's collapse on the lives of its
employees.7 8 Ms. Watkins has vividly noted that "she was just trying to
save the ship or at least get the captain of the ship to man the lifeboats. 79
In addition to voluntary disclosure by individuals due to moral outrage,
corporate management may self-report securities fraud in return for
leniency in sentencing.80 However, as many tips incentivized by Dodd-
Frank are expected to report Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")
violations, 81 Dodd-Frank arguably decreases corporate self-reporting. That
is, increased monetary incentives may encourage whistleblowers to report
externally to the SEC,82 whereas internal reporting could result in voluntary
corporate disclosure but for the prior external reporting.83 Critics argue that
voluntary FCPA self-reporting will increase because companies will have
little choice but to self-report due to the threat of reporting by Dodd-Frank
whistleblowers.84 Implicit in this reasoning, however, is the assumption
that there are a significant amount of undetected FCPA claims.85 Thus, at
78 MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 275 (2003). In a memo to Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, Ms.
Watkins stated, "[flor those of us who didn't get rich over the last few years, can
we afford to stay?," which demonstrates concern for Enron employees who, like
her, depended on Enron for their livelihood. Id.79 Id. at 281.80 Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 420-22
(2011).
81 Harker et al., supra note 34, at 2. See also Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44. The
FCPA prohibits bribery and requires that issuers within the scope of the Securities
Act maintain records, books, and accounts to a reasonable level of detail. 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
82 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 2 IF,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70514 (Nov. 17, 2010). See
also Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty
Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/
09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision.
83 Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 247,
273-74 (2010) (stating that "fifty of eighty-five FCPA investigations made
publicly available between 2005 and the fall of 2008 'were voluntarily disclosed to
the SEC or the DOJ following internal investigations by the companies."').
Yin Wilczek, Panel: Self-Reporting of FCPA Violations Only Real Option in Era
of Whistleblowers, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Dec 10, 2010).
85 See infra Pt.III.B. 1 (arguing that Dodd-Frank will result in frivolous
whistleblower tips). But see Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provision of Section 21 F, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70514 (noting a proposed SEC
mechanism whereby whistleblowers can seek guidance from corporate compliance
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least in the case of FCPA tips, monetary incentives may not be as effective
as intended or as in the tax fraud setting.
Also, the IRS analogy is not very persuasive because there is
conflicting evidence as to the success of the IRS bounty program. Under
the IRS program, whistleblower bounties take years to be issued, 6 and are
so uncertain that hedge funds invest in prospective awards.87 As of January
2010, the IRS had not yet paid a bounty under the program reformed in
2006.88 The Chief Counsel of the IRS has even stated that the bounty
program "was forced on us," a "disaster waiting to happen" 89 and a "ticking
time-bomb" 90  because the whistleblower program could result in
complaints about overzealous auditors.9' Nonetheless, advocates of the IRS
bounty program point to the billions of dollars in tax revenue the IRS stands
to gain under the program92 and the reliable information provided by
whistleblowers.9 3
A more compelling argument in support of the new SEC bounty
program, not cited in a relevant Senate Report,94 analogizes it to the False
Claims Act ("FCA").95 The FCA analogy is more compelling because qui
staff as to whether certain conduct constitutes securities fraud and still be eligible
for a bounty).
86 David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blowers Become Investment Option for Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/business/20whistleblower.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=1.
87 Id. (stating that hedge funds "[agree] to buy a percentage of [future payouts to
IRS whistleblowers] in exchange for a smaller amount upfront to the
whistleblowers). See also Bronner, supra note 75.
88 IRS Whistleblower Office Closer to First Aware Determinations Under New
Law, 2010 TNT 15-8, Jan. 25, 2010.
89 Kocieniewski, supra note 86.
90 Jeremiah Coder, Tax Analysts Exclusive: Conversations: Donald Korb, 2010
TNT 11-7, Jan. 19, 2010.
91 Id.
92 Cf Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1168 (Feldman and Lobel point out that
the IRS has already made billions. There is a logical inference that since the IRS
has recovered billions in the past, that they stand to recover billions in the future.).
93 Erika Kelton, Letters to the Editor: Korb Wrong about Whistleblower Program,
Writer Says, 2010 TNT 15-20, Jan. 25, 2010.
94 See generally S. REP. No. 111-176 (2009).
9' See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006). As with the SEC bounty program, awards
resulting from qui tam actions under the FCA may reach up to thirty of the
enforcement proceeds. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). For a thorough description of
relator/whistleblowers and the FCA, see Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1818-19.
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tam actions brought by private citizens on behalf of the United States96 have
more clearly led to successful enforcement actions.97 However, the FCA
may still be distinct from securities fraud for the same reasons tax fraud is
distinct from securities fraud. Expressly, securities fraud is more likely
than fraudulently claiming federal funds to involve morally culpable
conduct, which may outrage potential whistleblowers, result in voluntary
reporting and, in turn, obviate the need for monetary incentives.98 As with
tax fraud, one supporting argument is that FCA violations affect a more
diffuse group (i.e., the government) than securities fraud. Thus, a bounty is
more appropriate for FCA violations than securities fraud.
Finally, Dodd-Frank's legislative history suggests that Congress may
not have been very thoughtful in reforming the SEC's bounty program.
First, research cited by the Senate to support the proposition that
whistleblowers are instrumental in detecting and reporting fraud does not
address securities fraud per se, but rather all occupational fraud, which is
overinclusive and underinclusive of the Dodd-Frank bounty program's
scope.99 Second, there is little indication that Congress considered the
negative ramifications of providing whistleblowers with additional
monetary incentives.100 Rather, Congress appears to have followed a
common misconception that monetary incentives always increase reported
illegal activity without providing authority.'' Third, the relevant White
House press release does not propose a reformed SEC bounty program,
which is a major part of Dodd-Frank whistleblower reform. 1 2  Morethoughtful policy may have garnered initial executive support.
96 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994). While not a bounty program per se, qui tam actions
under the FCA encourage relator/whistleblowers to report fraud by bringing actions
on behalf of the United States government.
97 Thomas Harris, Alternate Remedies & the False Claims Act: Protecting Qui Tam
Relators in Light of Government Intervention and Criminal Prosecution Decisions,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1293, 1302 (2009). But see Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1841-
42 (stating that there is a lack of empirical evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of
FCA qui tam actions).
98 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1193-94.
99 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110 (2009) (citing Assessing the Madoff Scheme, supra
note 3). Expressly, only some securities fraud occurs in the occupational context
and only some occupational fraud is securities fraud.100 But see S. REP. No. 111-176, at 244 (2009).
101 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1190 (noting empirical research in which
survey participants "[revealed] a perception that a stranger's decision to report
[illegal activity] is more likely to be externally driven" as opposed to being driven
by moral considerations). See 156 CONG. REC. S4076 (May 20, 2010) (Senator
Shelby stating that "the guaranteed massive minimum payouts and limited SEC
flexibility ensures that a line of claimants will form at the SEC's door.").
102 See I.R.S. Press Release TG-205 (July 10, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg205.aspx.
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Accordingly, the SEC bounty program may not significantly increase fraud
reporting, detection or enforcement.
B. Dodd-Frank's Costs
There are certain to be additional costs from Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower provisions simply due to increased whistleblower
reporting.'0 3 As a result, attorneys providing whistleblower representation
and business compliance advice will benefit. Three types of laws
incentivize whistleblower reporting: anti-retaliation protection, monetary
incentives, and affirmative duties to report.'04 As noted, Dodd-Frank
adopts anti-retaliation measures (e.g. a private right of action in federal
court) and monetary incentives (e.g. the bounty program).,05  Each
incentive type will cause businesses and government agencies to incur
considerable costs.
1. Costs Resulting from Monetary Whistleblower Incentives
The Dodd-Frank bounty program imposes heavy costs on business
compliance and agency administration. Specifically, the new bounty
program will: (1) cause a flood of poor quality tips; (2) encourage
employees to report fraud externally rather than internally; (3) develop an
inflexible SEC fraud enforcement strategy; (4) not be cost-effective; and (5)
result in excessive and unnecessary litigation.
First, the bounty program is likely to incentivize frivolous, misleading,
exaggerated or otherwise unreliable tips. 10 6 As tip quality is rarely apparent
from a whistleblower complaint, frivolous tips impose costs associated with
administrative tip investigation and management.10 7 Further, unreliable tips
provide only a minimal benefit to gather evidence in the event that another
whistleblower provides related information indicating that there is actual
fraud. One concern is that misunderstanding of the reporting requirements
under the bounty program may result in employees reporting poor or
103 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44. See also Reisinger, supra note 44.
104 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1160.
105 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010).
106 See id. It should be noted that poor tips may have the relatively minor benefit of
inadvertently assisting with the evidentiary burden even if not meeting the pleading
requirement to be eligible for the bounty program.
107 Amy Kolz, Serial whistle-blower Joseph Piacentile makes millions helping the
government uncover fraud. That's how the False Claims Act is supposed to work.
Or is it?, AM. LAW., June 1, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?
id= 1202457711736&slretum= 1 &hbxlogin = 1.
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incomplete information "just in case" they have sufficient information. 10 8
Potentially ambiguous rules implementing Dodd-Frank or insufficient
notice of the bounty requirements may contribute to such
misunderstanding.' 09
In addition to complicated reporting standards, employees may not
understand the complicated legal standards for securities fraud."0  For
example, employees may report FCPA violations"' contributing to the
administrative backlog of tips despite, or perhaps because, FCPA violations
are not always clear due to ambiguous law."' It is expected that many tips
under the new bounty program will report potential FCPA fraud, 13 but
there is little FCPA case law because enforcement actions usually result in
settlement.! 4  As a result, FCPA actions are usually pursued under
sometimes conflicting agency interpretations that do not have the force of
law. 1 5 Also, many FCPA violations are already voluntarily reported by
whistleblowers."16
Similarly, complicated legal standards subject whistleblowers to
personal risk if Dodd-Frank encourages whistleblowers to report fraud.
Although a pre-Dodd-Frank case, Former Lehman Brother's Executive
Matthew Lee, for example, was fired as a result of calling attention to
Lehman Brother's questionable accounting practices.17 Even the most
knowledgeable commentator cannot state with certainty whether Repo 105
transactions, which Mr. Lee did not cite," 8 and other accounting practices
cited by Mr. Lee were legal under the generally accepted accounting
principles then in place. 19 Moreover, extensive legal analysis is required to
108 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70497 (Nov. 17, 2010).
'
09 See infra Pt.V.B.3.
110 See e.g., Kolz, supra note 107.
"'. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
112 Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill's Whistleblower Provisions and the
FCPA, FPCA PROFESSOR (July 20, 2010), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/
07/fmancial-reform-bills-whistleblower.html.
113 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44. See also Reisinger, supra note 44.
114 Koehler, supra note 112.
116 See Hinchey, supra note 80. Voluntary reporting may be a result of the outrage
that can be associated with securities fraud, in contrast to tax fraud. See discussion
supra Pt. III(A)(2).
Shira Ovide, Lehman Brothers Whistleblower Matthew Lee Again in Spotlight,
WALL ST. J. DEAL BLOG, Dec. 21, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/21 /
lehman-brothers-whistleblower-matthew-lee-again-in-spotlight/.
'
18 Id.
"19 See Steve Eder, Lehman Auditor May Bear the Brunt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14,
2011,
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determine whether Ernst & Young LLP, Lehman Brothers, and/or
executives in their personal capacity are liable for any fraud.1
20
Whistleblowers encouraged to report complicated securities fraud under
Dodd-Frank could suffer a similar fate to Mr. Lee. Thus, Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower provisions may harm individual whistleblowers and
government agencies due to the unclear legal and reporting standards.
Second, Dodd-Frank imposes costs by encouraging employees to report
fraud externally to the government rather than internally through corporate
compliance systems.' 2' Under the bounty program, employees stand to
earn a considerable award if they directly report fraud to the SEC, which
may not be available if the fraud is handled internally. 22  Critically,
external reporting undermines the effectiveness of internal corporate
compliance systems, which are often responsive 123 and effective 1 4 in
stemming fraud. Further, internal compliance systems can be more
efficient than external reporting in avoiding delay in correcting financial
misstatements and increasing the accuracy of management's assessment of
internal controls.125 It is also efficient for internal systems to screen tips to
126
reduce the volume of agency tips, preserve the SEC's limited resources,
and ease the SEC's recent difficulty managing tips.
http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB 100014240527487040275045761988407936
50766-1MyQjAxMTAxMDEwNDExNDQyWj .html.
120 Id.
121 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (Nov. 17, 2010). See also
Carton, supra note 82.
122 Id. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922, § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
But see Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70497 (proposing a mechanism whereby
whistleblowers may report internally and still receive a bounty).
123 See 2010 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE HOTLINE
BENCHMARKING REPORT NETWORK 70,
http://www.tnwinc.com/downloads/201 Obenchmarkingreport.pd? webSynclD= 1 e3
67c4 1 -c2ad-59d6-3c58-5448edcbOa5d&sessionGUID=39772723-a599-4ec7-8d64-
12c28ca90c9c (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (stating that companies investigated
seventy-three percent of reports, despite the fact that most reports are frivolous).
124 See id. at 22 (stating that forty of internal investigations led to action by the
company in 2009).
125 Public Comments from Joe DiLeo, Deloitte & Touche, to Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 10-12 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-1 0/s733 10-1 84.pdf.
126 See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act-Dates
to be Determined, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/dodd-frank/dates to be determined.shtml. See also Jessica Holzer, SEC
Delays Plans for Whistleblower Office, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2010,
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Ironically, Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provisions also undermine
other federal policy. By incentivizing external reporting to the detriment of
internal compliance, Dodd-Frank contradicts the policy behind SOX 404
provisions promoting effective internal control systems. Insomuch as
external reporting incentivizes small businesses to meet and exceed internal
compliance initiatives to avoid external reporting, 27 Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower provisions undermine Dodd-Frank's exemption of businesses
with market capitalization smaller than $75 million from SOX 404.128 Put
differently, the whistleblower provisions may effectively leave in place the
burden of closely scrutinizing internal controls, which is a small business
burden similar to SOX 404.129
Additional controls to prevent whistleblower retaliation 30 and
burdensome explanations to the SEC regarding the outcome of internal
investigations' 3' may be necessary due to the threat of increased
whistleblower reporting. Also, new compliance burdens may be
unnecessarily duplicative in light of other fraud detection measures already
in place including external audits, internal audits and existing internal
http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB 100014240527487043770045756512721197
01864-1MyQjAxMTAwMDAwMjEwNDIyWj.html.
127 See MICHAEL DELIKAT & RENEE PHILLIPS, CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ERA § 10:1 (2010) (outlining measures businesses can
implement to comply with SOX). Internal controls designed to avoid
whistleblower retaliation are increasingly important with an increasing number of
whistleblowers likely to result from additional whistleblower incentives. See
Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44. Moreover, Dodd-Frank expands the coverage of
whistleblower protection to affiliates and subsidiaries of public companies, which
will emphasize the need for compliance among these businesses. See also Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929(A).
128 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 989G(a). See
DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127. As Dodd-Frank increases whistleblower
incentives and protection, prudent business practices will maintain internal controls
to avoid whistleblower retaliation liability. See id.
129 Tina Chi, FCPA-Related Whistleblowing Likely to Grow; Companies Must
Boost Controls, Expert Says, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Dec.
22, 2010). See also Whistleblowing and the New Race to Report, DELOITTE, at 1
(2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FASForensicCenter us fas-
us dfc/usdfc/us dfc whistleblowing_120910.pdf. See also Roberta Romano,
Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. REG. 229, 239-43
(noting that business must implement controls and incur costs to comply with
SOX).
130 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 989G(b).
131 Richard J. Morvillo & Jeffrey F. Robertson, Whistleblowers and the Resurgence
of Internal Investigations, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Jan. 11,
2011).
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controls. 3 2 The SEC has implicitly acknowledged that the whistleblower
provisions will require improving internal systems while explaining that the
proposed rules do not require internal reporting. 133  To illustrate,
subsidiaries of public companies may require management training to avoid
whigileblower retaliation, and all businesses may need new policies to
encourage internal reporting. 1
34
Another cost resulting from the external reporting incentive is the
negative effect on organizational culture. The ethical nature of an
organization is shaped by management.13 By undermining management's
efforts to internally handle fraud and foster an ethical culture, Dodd-Frank
is concurrently harming the organizational culture. 136  Deteriorating
organizational culture has a cascading effect on internal compliance
because employees are more likely to report fraud internally in
organizations with an ethical culture, in which case there is less fear of
retaliation. 137 More broadly, as organizational culture affects organizational
performance, Dodd-Frank is harming the bottom line. 38 To note other
132 Michael K. Shaub & James F. Brown, Jr., Whistleblowing management
accountants: a US view, in GERALD VINTEN, WHISTLEBLOWING: SUBVERSION OR
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 107 (1994) (noting accountants' role in maintaining
internal controls, internal auditors' role in monitoring managerial accountants and
external auditors' role in attesting to fair presentation of financial statements). See
also Association for Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008 Report to the Nation on
Occupational Fraud & Abuse, ASS'N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS (2008),
available at http://www.intercedeservices.com/downloads/2008-rttn.pdf. Although
the ACFE report examines all occupational fraud, securities fraud is a subset of
occupational fraud which may be detected by these measures.
133 See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section
21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70496 (Nov. 17, 2010).
14 See infra Pt.VI.A.
13s Linda Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HAR. Bus. R., Mar.-
Apr 1994, at 106. See also Integrity Survey (2008-09), KPMG LLP 9 (Jan.
15,2009), http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/
Press-Releases/Documents/IntegritySuvey08_09.pdf.
136 See Paine, supra note 135, at 111 (stating that ethics systems are most effective
when imposed implicitly through organizational culture, rather than as an external
burden).
137 Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-
First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2009).
138 See THOMAS ROLLINS & DARRYL ROBERTS, WORK CULTURE, ORGANIZATIONAL
PERFORMANCE, AND BUSINESS SUCCESS 6 (1998) (noting that organizational culture
is linked to organizational performance). Rollins and Roberts identify the visibility
of high-profile companies attributing success to their culture, and quantitative,
empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Id. Other commentators have noted
that there is likely a positive connection between organizational culture and
organizational success/performance, but that empirical research is inconclusive
because of difficulties in defining "culture" due to the unique characteristics of
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costs, an SEC action may damage organizational reputation and decrease
shareholder wealth, 139 give rise to monetary penalties and costs of corporate
legal defense, 140 and forgo leniency for corporate self-reporting.
Third, Dodd-Frank implicitly mandates a SEC fraud enforcement
strategy rather than deferring to administrative expertise to set the
enforcement agenda.' 4 1 Dodd-Frank does so by creating administrative
costs that limit resources available to pursue alternative enforcement
methods.142  New costs facing the SEC include costs associated with
operating a new whistleblower office, 143  investigating additional
whistleblower tips,' 44 enforcement actions based upon those tips 145 and
paying mandatory whistleblower bounties. 146 Exacerbating the impact of
the costs is a budget shortfall, which has caused the SEC to defer some of
these mandates, including the creation of the new whistleblower office.
147
It is also possible that the SEC will face moral hazard in relying on
each organization's culture. MATS ALVESSON, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE 67-68 (2002) (noting that managers often believe there is a positive link
between culture and performance). See also NEAL M. ASHKANASY ET. AL.,
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE & CLIMATE 193-194 (2000) (stating
that future empirical research is likely to show a positive link between culture and
performance).
139 See Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and
Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REv. 1239, 1260, 1266 (2010).
140 Paine, supra note 135, at 109.
141 Carton, supra note 82 (citing Richard Wallace, Esq.).
142 Peter J. Henning, For the S.E.C., Problems of Time and Money, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/for-the-s-e-c-
problems-of-time-and-money/
A budget cutback, or even a budget freeze, while the S.E.C. is in
the midst of dealing with its new responsibilities for drafting and
enforcing rules governing the securities derivative markets and
hedge funds may mean the enforcement division will have to
drop investigations, or at least slow some of them down, while it
deals with other issues.
Id.
143 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 924, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
144 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 44 (noting that additional whistleblower tips are
expected as a result of Dodd-Frank). See also Reisinger, supra note 44.
145 Michael K. Lowman, Leading Lawyers on Working with the SEC, Structuring
Effective Compliance Programs, and Evaluating Securities Developments, SEC
COMPLIANCE BEST PRAC., 2010 WL 894704, at *2 (2010).
146 Dodd-Frank requires that whistleblowers who provide original information
leading to successful SEC or CFTC enforcement actions with proceeds greater than
1 million receive, at a minimum, ten of the proceeds as an award. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), § 21 F(b)(1)(A).
147 Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act-Dates to
be Determined, supra note 126. See also Holzer, supra note 126.
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informant tips.148 As a result of the foregoing, the SEC may not set its
enforcement strategy at it otherwise might.
One alternative SEC enforcement strategy is using test cases to signal
to the market or "draw a line in the sand" stating that their fraud
enforcement is focused on deterring a particular fraud type. 14 9 As part of a
markedly distinct strategy, Dodd-Frank mandates a report to assess whether
whistleblower tips are handled with administrative efficiency. 5 ° The SEC
is therefore expected to pursue each case reported by a whistleblower,
regardless of whether it is part of their strategy of identifying test cases.
The Congressional enforcement directive is especially unfortunate
because test cases can be very effective and require many resources. For
example, the SEC recently spent hundreds of thousands of dollars pursuing
a small insider trading case that only resulted in a $110 client gross profit
specifically to deter insider trading involving unregistered broker/dealers. 5 '
The SEC was willing to incur the high costs because it expects that other
cases of insider trading will be deterred by the threat of enforcement.
Another case illustrates the magnitude and importance of test cases.
Days prior to Dodd-Frank's enactment, the SEC reached a $550 million
settlement with Goldman Sachs as a result of an SEC investigation.1 52 The
case was designed, at least in part, to signal to the market that the SEC was
strengthening enforcement efforts against deceptive collateralized debt
obligation sales. 53  Significantly, it is probable that the SEC incurred
extremely high out-of-pocket expenses pursuing the settlement. 54  By
148 Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of
Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
281, 300 (2007).
149 Lowman, supra note 145, at 2 ("If there are certain people they feel are
gatekeepers ... the agency will take marginal dollar value cases if they can
advance a message they believe will advance the SEC's enforcement program.").
See also Carton, supra note 82.
150 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(d). (It
should be noted that the report may not be undertaken if the new whistleblower
office is not created).
151 Lowman, supra note 145 at 2.
152 Andrew Martin, S.E.C. Puts Wall St. on Notice, NY TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr. 19,
2010, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.con/2010/04/19/s-e-c-puts-wall-st-on-notice.
153 Id. See also Carton, supra note 82.
154 Although SEC enforcement expenses are not publicly available, the SEC
unquestionably spends considerable amounts of out-of-pocket expenses and
attorney time related to enforcement actions. Lowman, supra note 145. Regarding
the $550 million Goldman Sachs-SEC settlement, the long duration of the
investigation which lasted over a year, the large size of the alleged fraud which
resulted in a $550 million settlement and the complexity of the alleged fraud
involving sophisticated collateralized debt obligations, all indicate that the SEC
incurred significant expenditures during the investigation. Lindsay Fortado &
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pursuing this individual case, the SEC was addressing the subprime
mortgage crisis that had a devastating effect on the economy. Had Dodd-
Frank been in place prior to the Goldman settlement, the SEC may have
also been required to pay a large and unnecessary whistleblower bounty
($55-$165 million) or litigate against whistleblowers claiming a bounty.155
Taken in this light, Dodd-Frank's costs will mandate an SEC enforcement
strategy and limit scarce resources available for the SEC to pursue test
cases at its discretion.
Fourth, Dodd-Frank's requirement to award whistleblowers at least a
ten percent bounty is both overreaching and misplaced. 156 The ten percent
floor is overreaching because it may not be cost-effective. That is, the
marginal utility of providing a whistleblower with, for example $7 million
rather than $5 million, may not be a meaningful incentive to report fraud.
Further, Dodd-Frank may not be cost effective. There is little evidence in
the legislative history of Dodd-Frank that Congress contemplated whether
Dodd-Frank's costs might exceed the residual amount of fraud enforcement
proceeds deposited in the Investor Protection Fund once bounties are paid
from the Fund.'
57
Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Fined $27 Million for Not Reporting Probe,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-
09/goldman-sachs-fined-27-million-by-u-k-for-failing-to-report-tourre-probe.htm
(noting that the SEC has been investigating the Goldman Sachs Abacus deal since
August 2008). Patricia Hurtado & Christine Harper, SEC Settlement with Goldman
Sachs for $550 Million Approved by U.S. Judge, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 21,
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/goldman-sachs-settlement-
with-sec-for-550-million-approved-by-u-s-judge.html.
155 As an alternative to whistleblower leads, poor investment performance often
leads to regulatory investigation of securities fraud. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al.,
SEC Probes Other Soured Deals, WALL ST. J, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704508904575192294041013802.
html (noting that the SEC is investigating securities fraud in underperforming
funds). See also Gretchen Mortgenson & Landon Thomas, A Glare on Goldman,
From U.S. and Beyond, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/a-glare-on-goldman-from-u-s-and-
beyond/ (noting that members of Congress have been requesting that the SEC
investigate mortgage securities deals due to government investment in financial
institutions like A.I.G.).
156 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 111 (2009) (stating that the "critical component of the
whistleblower program is the minimum payout that any individual could look
towards in determining whether to take the enormous risk of blowing the whistle in
calling attention to fraud"). See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922(a), § 2 1F(b)(l)(A), 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
157 But see S. REP. No. 111-176, at 244 (2009) (stating the "minority view" of the
Dodd-Frank bill).
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Moreover, the ten percent floor is misplaced because it may not provide
certainty as intended.158 Whistleblower bounties are anything but certain
because other whistleblowers may provide information entitling them to a
portion of the bounty. 59 As noted above, ambiguity about the reporting
standard or securities law can also decrease certainty.160 Although
whistleblower bounties are likely to be unnecessarily high with little
marginal utility, they may not provide certainty as intended.
Fifth, the new bounty program is likely to lead to unnecessary
litigation. One reason is because Dodd-Frank entitles whistleblowers to
appeal the amount of a bounty awarded by the SEC.161 Under the new
bounty program, bounties are determined on an ad hoc basis using
subjective factors, but must be within ten to thirty percent of the penalty
collected as a result of the tip.' 62 Subjective criteria make award amounts
an easy target to dispute. Further, appeals are incentivized because
successful appeals could yield lofty rewards representing a portion of high
penalties in SEC fraud actions.'
63
Dodd-Frank also invites litigation to establish the contours of the
reporting standard and define key terms including "original information.
164
Without a clear reporting standard, a whistleblower's burden of proof is
ambiguous and litigation is needed to specify the level of detail required to
obtain a whistleblower bounty. 65 For example, whistleblowers with less
conclusive evidence of fraud, or perhaps just a hunch, may file claims
seeking an award. 166  Moreover, secondary whistleblowers providing
'
58 Id. at 111.
159 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a),
§ 21 F(b)(1). See also Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provision of Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488,
70499 (Nov. 17, 2010).
160 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70514 (stating that whistleblowers may be mistaken about
securities laws).
161 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a),
§ 21F(f).
162 Id see also S. REP. No. 111-176, at 244 (2009). Some have also criticized the
Dodd-Frank bounty program for eliminating the SEC's discretion to award
bounties in amounts less than ten percent of the fraud penalty.
163 Dodd-Frank entitles whistleblowers to bounties only if an SEC or CFTC action
results in monetary sanctions greater than 1 million. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922, § 21 F(a)(1).
'64 Id. See also id. at sec. 922(a), § 21F(a)(3).
165 See Telephone Interview with Dan Sandman, U.S. Steel Vice Chairman and
Chief Legal & Administrative Officer and General Counsel (Ret.)(Oct. 15, 2010).
166 See, e.g., Kolz, supra note 107. Kolz describes the case of Joseph Piacentile, a
whistleblower who does not report fraud as an employee or business partner, but
instead in reliance of potentially unreliable secondhand information resulting from
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information about fraud that has already been reported may file a claim
seeking a portion of the bounty. 67 While the SEC's proposed rules provide
some guidance to limit uncertainty and curb litigation,' 6' discretionary
standards nonetheless provide potential for considerable litigation.
2. Costs Resulting from Anti-Retaliation Protection
Anti-retaliation protection costs are exemplified by existing
whistleblower protection that extends to government agencies and publicly
traded companies, but not private businesses.1 69 Implicit in the absence of
whistleblower protection for employees of privately held businesses is the
public policy determination that fraud at privately held businesses does not
pose a threat to society which warrants imposing the costs associated with
federal whistleblower protection.
1 70
Perhaps the most significant cost of Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation
protection is the direct access to federal courts provided to whistleblowers,
which may lead to expensive litigation. Under existing law, whistleblowers
were granted access to federal courts only if there was administrative delay
such that a final order was not issued within a 180 day statute of
his own investigations. Id. As there is little or no disincentive to deter unreliable
whistleblower tips, one lawyer has noted that "even if [Piacentile] hits a couple, his
batting average is terrible." Id. But see Proposed Rules for Implementing the
Whistleblower Provision of Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed.
Reg. 70488, 70499 (Nov. 17, 2010).
167 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70499. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376
(2010). See, e.g., Kolz, supra note 107.
168 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 924(a).
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F, 75
Fed. Reg. at 70497.
169 Frank Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At- Will
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L.
REv. 545, 546-47 (2004). The exclusion of private company employees from
whistleblower protection is contrasts with more encompassing federal anti-
discrimination laws. Id.
170 See KOHN ET AL., supra note 17, at xiv (noting that whistleblower protection for
employees of publicly held companies serves the public interest). Harsh results to
employees of privately-held companies are avoided through secondary employer
liability, which may be the result of state policy decisions to protect private
employees from whistleblower retaliation. First, there is secondary liability under
state blues sky laws. Cavico, supra note 169, at 550. Second, common law tort
actions provide secondary liability. Id. at 550-52. Specifically, many state statutes
allow wrongfully discharged employees to recover damages from their employer in
tort. Id at 579.
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limitations. 7 ' Litigation in federal court results in additional costs because
it often includes expensive discovery, litigation and appeals processes.
72
In contrast, administrative hearings limit costs because they are not
governed by the rules of evidence173 and may be amended or streamlined to
accommodate an executive's budget concerns.
17 4
Dodd-Frank also prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements and
waiver of statutory whistleblower protection. 175 Arbitration and waiver can
be effective tools to combat the business burdens resulting from expanded
whistleblower protection. 76 By eliminating these cost-cutting options, 77
Dodd-Frank forces parties into expensive litigation in federal court.
Another cost is adverse selection with regard to frivolous tips. Since
whistleblower protection applies even if they are providing invalid tips,
employees fearing discipline or termination may report false tips solely to
obtain whistleblower protection that may prevent an employer from
terminating an employee. 79  Broadening whistleblower protection may
therefore have the effect of requiring businesses to retain employees they
would otherwise terminate. Additionally, agencies incur costs screening
frivolous tips. In light of the foregoing, Dodd-Frank's broadening of anti-
retaliation protection poses a considerable burden.
171 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2006). See also KOHNETAL.,supra note 17, at 5.
172 Robert Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENY.
U. L. REV. 287, 296 (2010) (stating that increasing federal litigation expense hasgiven rise to a movement in alternative dispute resolution).
f73 Schuler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 03-3734, 2004 WL 2030280, at *102 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing Cline v. Sec. of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 444 F.2d 289, 291 (6th
Cir. 1971)).
174 Andrew Page, What's the Cost of Living in Oregon These Days? A Fresh Look
at the Need for Judicial Protections in the Death with Dignity Act, 22 REGENT L.
REv. 233,253 (2009).
175 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(c)(2), § 1514A(e)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010).
176 Robert Rhoad et al., Whistling While They Work: Limiting Exposure in the Face
of the PPACA 's Invitation to Employee Whistleblower Lawsuits, 22
A.B.A. HEALTH L. SEC. 19, 19 (2010).
177 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(c)(2), §
1514(A)(e)(2).
178 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1177 ("Overprotection may encourage bad-
faith reporting and exaggerated, or even false, accusations. It can also diminish the
positive ties and organizational citizenship behavior of institutional players.").
179 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), §
21 F(h)(1). Section 922(a) only requires that an employee report information, not
that the employee report accurate information, to obtain whistleblower protection.
See id.
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lV. PROSPECTS FOR LEGISLATIVELY AMENDING DODD-FRANK
Notwithstanding any plausible reform proposals, it is unlikely that
Congress will amend or repeal the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
One factor indicating that Congress will not amend Dodd-Frank is the
influence of the trial lawyer lobby. Admittedly, it is difficult to measure a
particular special interest's influence because it is difficult to know the
specific purpose behind political contributions.1 80  Exacerbating this
difficulty are political contributions made not just by political
organizations, but trial lawyers individually, their families and law firms.' 8 '
Despite this difficulty, the American Association for Justice, which is the
preeminent trial lawyer lobbying association, is regarded as an influential
contributor to Congressional members and the Obama administration
during Dodd-Frank's enactment.m
82
If incentives suggest the purpose behind contributions, the trial lawyer
lobby is certainly a likely promoter of whistleblower bounties because
attorneys stand to gain considerably from whistleblower litigation.'83 The
SEC bounty program is expected to be a significant boon to trial lawyers
just as qui tam actions under the False Claims Act earn trial lawyers
180 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 305 (4th ed. 2007) (noting
uncertainty, in the context of bribery, regarding situations that "fall somewhere
along the spectrum between clearly legitimate arrangements and patently corrupt
deals"). Contributions to a candidate or organization may be a result of a donor's
wish to support a variety of issues or candidates for past or future behavior. Id. at
304. For information about the American Association for Justice Political Action
Committee contributions and expenditures, see American Assn for Justice,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strlD=C0002452 I&cycle=2010.
181 Chris Rizo, Group says trial lawyers actually gave $35 Million to political
causes, LEGALNEwSLINE (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/226145-group-says-trial-lawyers-actually-
gave-35-million-to-political-causes.
182 David Ingram, Trial Lawyers Sticking With Democratic Party, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
19, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 202473540921 &Trial Lawyers-
StickingWithDemocraticParty. See also David Freddoso, Will Obama
administration give trial lawyers a $1.6 billion tax break?, WASH. EXAMINER, July
14, 2010, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-
confidential/will-obama-administration-give-trial-lawyers-a- 16-billion-tax-break-
98413014.html. But see Kara Rowland, Trial Lawyer Lobby Sinks $6.2M in Debt,
WASH. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/28/
trial-lawyers-lobby-is-62-m-in-debt/ (noting that the trial lawyer lobby may have
had limited influence on Dodd-Frank if they only have limited financial resources).
183 Harker et al., supra note 34, at 780-81 (noting that trial lawyers may benefit
handsomely from the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions).
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handsome fees. 184 Moreover, trial lawyers benefit not only from legal fees
taking a portion of lucrative whistleblower bounties, but also in
negotiations with employers on behalf of terminated employees claiming
whistleblower protection. 185 Thus, the presence of trial lawyers' interest
stands as a potential bar to more thoughtful policy and whistleblower
reform.
Another factor indicating that Congress will not amend Dodd-Frank is
the prospect that reform will open the door to amending other Dodd-Frank
provisions or other legislation enacted by the 111 th Congress, including the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"). 186 To illustrate,
consider that Congress recently declined to amend the PPACA to eliminate
a new Form 1099 ("1099") reporting requirement designed to close the tax
gap and pay for health care reform. 187 The 1099 reporting requirement
requires all businesses to prepare 1099s for goods and services purchased
from vendors that cumulatively exceed $600 during the course of the
taxable year. 1
88
However, the 1099 reporting requirement may not have carefully
contemplated the considerable compliance burden placed on small
business. 189 Also, it is not clear that the 1099 requirement will increase
income reporting as intended because businesses may not comply, and even
with business compliance, it will be administratively difficult for the IRS to
process the information in a useful way. 190 Despite the negative
implications, Congress rejected proposals to eliminate or amend the
184 Harris, supra note 97, at 1302-03.
185 William Olsen, Major Whistleblower Provisions in Financial Regulation Bill,
CATO INSTITUTE, July 16. 2010, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/major-
whistleblower-provisions-in-financial-regulation-bill/.
186 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
187 Alexander Bolton, Senate Defeats Plan to Strip Filing Requirement from Health
Care Law, HILL, Sept. 14, 2010, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/118637-
senate-defeats-effort-to-strip- 1099-requirement-from-health-law.
188 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, sec. 9006, § 6041,
124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010). "Current law dictates that only services provided in
excess of $600 must be reported via Form 1099 and that corporations (with the
exception of attorneys) are exempt from receiving 1099s." Amy Mignogna,
Concern over new 1099 reporting requirement gaining momentum, CPA VOICE,
Aug. 2010, at 7. Notably, credit card transactions are exempt from this
requirement. Id.
189 Robert Pear, Many Push for Repeal of Tax Provision in Health Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at A25. Democratic support for repealing the requirement
suggests that it may not have been carefully contemplated because Democratic
votes were the primary source of support to enact the PPACA. Id.
190 Amy Mignogna, Federal tax proposals heat up over summer months, CPA
VOICE, Sept. 2010, at 11.
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requirement, in part due to reluctance to open the door to amend other
legislation and in part due to an inability to replace expected tax revenue.' 9'
As applied to Dodd-Frank, it is unlikely that Congress will amend the new
whistleblower provisions because it would open the door to amending other
controversial and distantly related Dodd-Frank provisions.
V. AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION & PROPOSED RULE ANALYSIS
Administrative action is a plausible way to remedy the costs of the
Dodd-Frank bounty program. The SEC and CFTC may achieve Dodd-
Frank's purpose and limit associated costs by: (1) adopting practices to
better manage whistleblower tips; (2) amending the SEC's Proposed Rules;
and (3) considering two novel rule proposals.
A. Administrative Efficiency: Improving Tip Management
As noted at the outset, whistleblower reform cannot achieve its policy
ends if there are not administrative structures in place to properly manage
whistleblower tips. That is, no incentive to report fraud, monetary or
otherwise, will address the underlying problems if the enforcement agency
does not act on fraud reports. With this in mind, administrative reform in
the way the SEC manages whistleblower tips and its bounty program
should have been implemented and assessed prior to enacting Dodd-Frank's
more sweeping and costly changes. 192 Had assessment of administrative
reform demonstrated improved fraud enforcement, many of the Dodd-Frank
provisions may have proved overreaching or even unnecessary because
Dodd-Frank's purpose would have already been achieved. Put simply, it is
possible, perhaps even likely, that existing voluntary whistleblower reports
are sufficient to achieve Dodd-Frank's purpose of exposing Ponzi schemes
191 Pear, supra note 189 ("The White House is nervous about a repeal, fearing that
it could set a precedent for rolling back other unpopular features of the law.").
Repeal of the 1099 requirement was not included in the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 or otherwise achieved
during the lame duck session of the 111 th Congress. American Institute of CPAs,
Congress Resolves Many Tax Issues During Lame-Duck Session, TAX ADVISOR,
Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/NewsAndPublications/
taxnews/Pages/20101222.aspx. While the House of Representatives recently
passed a bill to repeal the Form 1099 requirement, it is not expected to pass the
Senate due to disagreement about how to pay for "lost" revenue. Robert Pear,
House Votes to Help Small Businesses Comply with Health Bill, but Relief Is Held
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/health/policy/
04health.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
192 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 26, at vi-vii.
2011 Blowing the Whistle on the 149
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
and structured finance fraud, but that agencies have not been responsive
enough to benefit from the tips.
193
Indeed, the SEC's proposed rules provide measures that are designed to
improve information management, including clear reporting procedures,
94
standardized forms'95 and communication procedures. 196  Specifically,
whistleblowers must fill out three forms: a form TCR providing the tip
information; a form WB-DEC essentially stating that the information is
eligible for an award; and a form WB-APP claiming the award following a
SEC covered action. 197 While the SEC has expressed concern that these
measures are procedural hurdles that may be overly burdensome and deter
whistleblower reporting," the forms should be adopted because the simple
presence of any standardized form provides critical procedures to organize
tip gathering. Further, separation may avoid paying bounties to
whistleblowers who are not motivated by monetary incentives.
Additionally, the proposed rules should adopt pre-Dodd-Frank
Inspector General recommendations to reform the SEC's existing bounty
program, many of which are applicable to managing whistleblower tips
even in the absence of a bounty program. 199 Specifically, a 2010 Inspector
General Report reveals that the SEC's insider trading bounty program had
basic deficiencies and provides the following corresponding
recommendations:
200
* The SEC's bounty program has made few payments to date and
should be more publicized.2 ° '
* Information on the SEC's website about applying for a bounty is
misleading.202 As such, there should be a standardized form to
193 See discussion infra Pt.III.A.
194 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70501 (Nov. 17, 2010).
'9' Id. at 62.
196 Id. at 84.
197 Id. at 96.
198Id. at 116.
199 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 26, at vi-vii. Interestingly, Dodd-Frank
calls for another Inspector General report to assess the new whistleblower
provisions despite the presence of the aforementioned report. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 922(d), §
1514A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010). As the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions
were enacted prior to the implementation and assessment of existing
recommendations, it is questionable whether a new Inspector General Report will
gamer attention necessary to result in administrative reform and improved
enforcement.
200 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 26, at 4-22.
201 Id. at 8.
202 id.
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report illegal activity and policies for following up with
whistleblower tips.
20 3
" Existing criteria (pre-Dodd-Frank) for awarding bounties is overly
vague. There should be more objective criteria for determining
whistleblower award amounts.
204
* The SEC does not update whistleblowers with the status of their
case and should communicate with whistleblowers more to
encourage reporting additional information.0 5
* Bounty applications are handled on an ad hoc basis and better
tracking of applications should result in more timely review.
20 6
* Bounty applicant's files sometimes contain incomplete information
and the SEC should require a bounty file with specific
information.20 7
* The SEC should implement best practicesfrom other agencies.20 8
To strengthen the proposed rules with Inspector General
recommendations, the SEC should maintain individualized whistleblower
files. With the files, the SEC should notify individual whistleblowers at
their last known address, rather than the public at-large, when tips result in
209a covered action. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether these
improvements to tip management are practical due to SEC budget
constraints, which have postponed the creation of the new whistleblower
office.2 '0 Regardless, Dodd-Frank's sweeping whistleblower reform may
have been unnecessary in light of several basic recommendations to better
manage and utilize existing whistleblower reports to enforce fraud.
B. Proposed Rule Analysis
Despite potentially heavy costs that may result from the Dodd-Frank
bounty program, carefully written SEC rules must "separate the wheat from
203 Id. at 11.
204 Id. at 12-13. It should be noted that Dodd-Frank provides several factors for
determining the amount of whistleblower awards Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), § 21 F(c)(1).
205 SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 26, at 13-15.
206 Id. at 15-19.
207 Id. at 19-20.
208 Id. at 20-22.
209 Public Comment from District of Columbia Bar, to Proposed Rule for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 1-2 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33- 10/s73310-146.pdf.210 Yin Wilczek, Whistleblower Program Seen Mirroring SEC Proposal, but
Depends on Budget Cuts, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILiTY REPORT (Jan. 11,
2011).
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the chaff' 21' to limit costs, encourage reliable tips and maintain the purpose
of Dodd-Frank moving forward.21 2 It is critical to note that the proposed
rules do not bar whistleblowers from reporting externally per se, but rather
limit their eligibility for a lucrative whistleblower bounty while preserving
retaliation protection.213 Recognizing that it is a windfall gain at stake,
rather than protection of one's livelihood, it is more acceptable to have high
eligibility standards under the bounty program. Further justifying high
standards, monetary incentives may not be a major impetus for reporting
securities fraud.214 The rules should be specifically amended to: (1) require
internal reporting; (2) appropriately restrict standing; (3) adopt heightened
pleading; (4) expose whistleblowers and attorneys to risk; (5) and further
address the anti-retaliation provisions.
1. Require Internal Reporting & Waiting Period
The SEC should require whistleblowers seeking a bounty to report
securities fraud internally and grant an extended period of time for internal
compliance systems to remedy the fraud. Because the proposed rules do
not require internal reporting, one issue presented is how to avoid a
whistleblower's "race to external reporting" with other whistleblowers and
corporate compliance staff.2 15 Whistleblowers are incentivized to be the
first to report because only "original information" is worthy of a bounty
while corporate compliance is incentivized to self-report to obtain leniency
in sentencing.2t 6
211 Yin Wilczek, SEC Enforcement Director Acknowledges 'Challenges' in Writing
Whistleblower Rules, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Oct. 27,
2010).
212 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(j), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Dodd-Frank gives the SEC 270
days, until April 21, 2011, to write rules implementing the bounty program. Id.
§ 924(a). CHARLES KOCH, JR., 1 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 4.1 (3d ed. 2010) (stating
that "rulemaking is foremost a policymaking device").
213 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70489 (Nov. 17, 2010).
214 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
215 See supra Pt.III.B. 1.
216 Carton, supra note 82. Whistleblowers are only entitled to awards under the
new bounty program if they provide original information. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1). See also Proposed
Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 70495-99 (defining "original information"). Explicitly, whistleblowers may
report externally to the SEC, rather than internally to management, to avoid delay
and mitigate the risk of foregoing or sharing an award due to another whistleblower
reporting sooner, collecting the award, and rendering the information non-original.
Id.
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The proposed rules address the race to external reporting by providing a
mechanism whereby whistleblowers may maintain eligibility and their
place in line for a bounty up to ninety days after internal reporting.2I7 In
addition, the proposed rules incentivize internal reporting by identifying
internal reporting as a factor that will lead to a higher bounty.218 However,
these incentives do not guarantee internal reporting and are not attractive to
some whistleblowers who: may not want to prolong the potentially
emotional whistleblowing process;21 9 may be skeptical of corporate
interests to detect fraud;220 and may not be aware of internal reporting
incentives any more than they are aware of the specifics of the underlying
securities laws.22 As presented, the proposed rules may be an unsuccessful
attempt to toe the line between business and whistleblower interests.
To counteract the external reporting incentive, Congress should adopt a
provision requiring that whistleblowers report internally before reporting to
the SEC or CFTC.222  Candidly, whistleblowers usually report internally
before reporting externally, even in the case of qui tam whistleblowers who
are incentivized by a reward.223 However, whistleblowers may first report
internally because they are not aware of incentives or options for external
reporting. 224 With uncertainty about when whistleblowers report externally,
217 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70516.
218 Id. at 70500. Curiously, the proposed rules also grant the SEC discretion to
allow corporate compliance even after a whistleblower externally reports a tip,
which is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank's policy to provide certainty to
whistleblowers. Id. at 70496. Under the rule, reporting would not be certain and
even deceive whistleblowers making the emotional decision to report fraud. Id. at
70517. If a whistleblower reports fraud and the SEC subsequently allows a
business to remedy a securities violation with little penalty, the whistleblower may
not receive the bounty that incentivized reporting in the first place. Such a result is
especially troublesome when whistleblower anonymity is impracticable because
only a select few individuals within an organization are likely to be aware of the
reported fraud.
21 Cavico, supra note 169, at 545.
220 Whistleblowers may decide not to report internally due to the potential conflict
of interest between corporate interests and whistleblower interests to detect fraud or
collect a whistleblower award.
221 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70516.
222 Carton, supra note 82.
223 The Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal Compliance, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWER
CENTER 5 (2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-212.pdf.
See also Lobel, supra note 137, at 1250.
224 Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationship among Beliefs,
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27
ACADEMY MGMT. J. 687, 701 (1984). See also Proposed Rules for Implementing
the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70488.
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the mere presence of initial internal reporting will not ensure that internal
systems have an opportunity to investigate and remedy the fraud before
external reporting. The proposed rules should avoid the harm of
unnecessary external reporting by not only allowing whistleblowers to
maintain their place in line upon internal reporting, but requiring internal
reporting and giving internal compliance an extended period, perhaps 180
days following internal reporting, before fraud may be reported
extemally.
225
Public policy often requires internal reporting in analogous situations.
Elsewhere in the securities laws, for example, illegal activity must be
reported internally before reporting to the SEC. Section 10A of the
Exchange Act requires that auditor's report fraud to company management
before reporting to the board of directors, who must inform the SEC. 226 In
addition, shareholder derivative rights of action echo similar policy
rationale by generally requiring either a demand on the board of directors or
a determination by a special litigation committee before properly
proceeding to court.22 7 Moreover, other countries, including Germany and
Britain, require internal reporting to qualify for anti-retaliation protection or
monetary incentives.228
If internal reporting is required, whistleblower awards should be based
upon the size of the fraud when the whistleblower initially became aware of
the fraud.229 Otherwise, bounties may have the adverse effect of
discouraging potential whistleblowers who would otherwise report fraud.23 °
Allowing the fraud to persist will likely increase the size of the fraud, and
225 See Morvillo & Robertson, supra note 131 (stating that ninety days may not
give internal compliance systems sufficient time to investigate whistleblower
complaints).
226 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)(B) (2010).
227 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996) (stating that "[a]
stockholder filing a derivative suit must allege either that the board rejected his pre-
suit demand that the board assert the corporation's claim or allege with particularity
why the stockholder was justified in not having made the effort to obtain board
action."). See also id (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984) (The
demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.")).
228 Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, UK, and US.
Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 890 (2004)
(stating that British law requires internal reporting to obtain anti-retaliation
protection); Matthias Schmidt, "Whistle Blowing" Regulation and Accounting
Standards Enforcement in Germany and Europe-An Economic Perspective
UNWERSITAT MARBURG 21, http://www.wiwi.uni-marburg.de/ZentrEinr/Dekanat/
fk_paperschmidt.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (noting the German internal
reporting requirement).
229 Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1845-46.
23 0 id.
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with it, the size of the SEC penalty and bounty.231 Thus, freezing the
bounty in time is necessary to combat this disincentive.
In the likely event that the SEC does not require internal reporting
under the final rules, 232 the SEC should maintain the internal reporting
incentives in the proposed rules and provide objective criteria for internal
control systems as a safe harbor from liability or leniency incentive.
233
Under this proposal, defendant corporations have the burden of proving that
internal controls met the objective requirements.234 In a similar context,
antitrust law contains objective business practices companies may follow to
obtain sentencing leniency.235 Regarding FCPA violations, one proposal
offers twelve objective criteria that must be met to fall under a safe
harbor.236 The proposal provides certainty to companies by recognizing
that internal systems which result in self-reporting provide a significant
benefit to law enforcement. 37  For the reasons stated above, the SEC
should amend the proposed rules to support internal compliance systems.
2. Restrictive Standing Requirements
Ideally, standing requirements will minimize the cost of frivolous tips
made by profit-driven persons and make ineligible whistleblowers with pre-
existing duties to report (i.e., involuntary parties). Under the proposed
rules, such "involuntary" whistleblowers are not eligible for a bounty. 38
More controversial are the listed exclusions to how whistleblowers may
obtain "independent knowledge," which essentially define the standing
requirements.2 39 The listed exclusions affect the whistleblower status of
attorneys, accountants, other professionals, compliance officers and any
231 Id.
232 Wilczek, supra note 210. An internal reporting requirement is not expected to be
enacted under the final rules.
233 Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A proposalfor a United States
Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 153, 219-20 (2010). See also Public Comments from General
Electric Co. et al., to Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 4-5 (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-179.pdf.
234 Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 233, at 220.
235 Id. at 158-59.
236 Id. at 219-20. For business compliance advice similar to the proposal offered
by Tarun and Tomczak, see discussion infra Pt.VI.
237 Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 233, at 215.
238 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70490 (Nov. 17, 2010).2 39 Id. at 19-20.
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culpable party.240 Rules should be implemented to severely curtail these
parties' eligibility for a bounty.
First, the proposed rules properly limit attorney whistleblower standing.
Namely, information obtained through legal representation for an attorney's
owribenefit as well as information subject to attorney-client privilege may
not" be used to obtain a whistleblower bounty.24 1 It is unnecessary to
incentivize attorneys to report information obtained through legal
representation due to pre-existing professional responsibilities.242
More controversial is the use of privileged materials in such actions.
To be sure, an in-house attorney whistleblower may use materials protected
by the attorney-client privilege to prove a SOX 806 whistleblower
retaliation claim.243 n Jordan v. Sprint Nextel, an administrative tribunal
invoked Fifth Circuit precedent citing ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), which
states that "[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. . . to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client."
244
However, in the context of Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounties,
privileged information should not be admissible evidence. Retaliatory
discharge claims by an in-house attorney involve situations where the
attorney clearly has a controversy with the employer, as referenced in Rule
1.6(b)(5). By contrast, suits claiming a whistleblower bounty do not
necessarily involve a controversy between the lawyer and the client if the
attorney has been harmed only indirectly as a member of society, rather
than individually.
In the case of employees or third parties seeking privileged materials
where the corporation is the client, privileged materials should not be
admissible to avoid creating a monetary incentive to undermine attorney-
client privilege. 245 Also, whistleblowers have a compelling interest to
preserve their livelihood in retaliatory discharge claims that may not be
present with bounty claims. As such, confidentiality is properly preserved
in the retaliatory discharge context, but not the bounty claim context. For
these reasons, the rule excluding privileged materials from proving bounty
claims should be adopted.
240 Id. at 19-28.
241 Id. at 20-21.
242Id. at21 n.25.
243 Jordan v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 06-105, Administrative Review Board's Order of
Remand, at 2 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 30, 2009).
244 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
245 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70490 (Nov. 17, 2010).
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Second, the proposed rules limit the eligibility of independent public
accountants by prohibiting the use of information obtained through the
performance of an engagement required by the securities laws.246 However,
limiting the exclusion to required engagements is too narrow in scope. The
accountant exclusion should preclude accountants from earning bounties
any time they obtain information in their professional capacity. As noted
by major accounting firms, a broader restriction excluding information
obtained from non-audit services is needed to preserve confidentiality and
foster a culture of trust between accountants and their clients.241 Similarly,
investment advisors echo this reasoning in arguing that they should not be
eligible for whistleblower bounties.248
Third, the proposed rules limit the eligibility of corporate compliance
personnel when they obtain information from persons expecting them to
respond to a violation or through an internal compliance system. 249 To
incentivize effective internal compliance, these exclusions are not
applicable if the entity does not disclose the information to the SEC within
a reasonable time or acts in bad faith.250 These exclusions are appropriately
designed to support internal corporate compliance systems by preventing
compliance personnel from "front running" internal compliance systems. 1
However, the rules go too far insomuch as they effectively create a duty
to disclose.252  Expressly, the rules require businesses to disclose
246 Id. at 22.
247 Public Comments from PricewaterhouseCooper LLP, to Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 3 (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/
comments/s7-33-10/s73310-281.pdf. See also Public Comments from KPMG
LLP, to Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section
21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 2-3 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-152.pdf; Public Comments from Joe
DiLeo, supra note 125, at 3. But see Public Comments from Laura Montgomery,
Ernst & Young LLP, to Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21 F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 4-5 (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://sec.gov/comnients/s7-33-1 0/s73310-176.pdf (stating that
there are some instances in which auditors should be eligible for whistleblower
bounties).
248 Public Comments from Jim DeLoach, Protiviti Risk & Business Consulting, to
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 2 IF of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 2 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73 310-178.pdf.
249 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70493.250 id.
251 Id. at 70493-94.
252 But see id. at 70494 n.36 (stating that "This provision does not impose new
reporting requirements in addition to those already existing under the federal
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information obtained through internal systems to the SEC within a
reasonable time. 3 One problem with the reasonable time exception is that
not all compliance staff will be aware of the status of all internal
investigations (i.e., when they began and whether they have been reported
to the SEC). As such, compliance staff will have to make an uninformed
decision about whether a reasonable time has passed before reporting
externally.254 It is a significant burden on internal compliance systems to
inform all compliance personnel as to the status of all investigations, which
is necessary to disable compliance personnel from reporting externally at
any time under the bounty program.255 Other issues arise due to the
uncertainty that results from the reasonable time exception. The exception
would eliminate issuer discretion to disclose investigations regarding minor
or self-remediated violations. 6 In doing so, the rule is subjecting internal
investigations to uncertainty because they may be potentially overruled by
SEC review. 7  Furthermore, the exception does not preserve
confidentiality because SEC review could reveal confidential information
gathered during internal investigations. 58 Under these circumstances,
employees may not be as candid as they otherwise might and the rule
undermines the effectiveness of internal compliance systems.
The reasonable time exception may further harm businesses by rushing
internal compliance because it is difficult to know when to close a
whistleblower investigation.259  For example, Renault SA recently
experienced an embarrassing public affair by acting too quickly in response
to an anonymous corporate espionage tip.260 In Renault's case, executives
accused of leaking secret company information to competitors were fired
following a four-month investigation.26 ' However, Renault uncovered no
evidence against the fired executives and the whistleblower likely sold false
securities laws."). The SEC's states that there is no additional reporting
requirement, but nonetheless requires firms to self-report potential violations.
253 Id. at 70493-94.
254 Public Comments from General Electric Co. et al., supra note 233, at 6.
255 Id. at 7.
256 Id.
257 Id,
258 Id. See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of
Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70510 (Nov.
17, 2010).259 Ashby Jones & Joann Lublin, Firms Revisit Whistleblowing, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/articleemail/SB 1000142405274870332740457619
4913231712904-IMyQjAxMTAxMDEwMzExNDMyWj.html. See also Sebastian
Moffett, In Renault Spy Case, Deja- Vu, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article email/SB 100014240527487035978045761947741104
38358-1MyQjAxMTAxMDEwNDExNDQyWj.html.
260 Jones & Lublin supra note 259.
261 Id.
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262information to extort money. The affair concluded with an embarrassing
public apology from Renault.
263
To support internal compliance systems, the proposed rules should
eliminate the reasonable time exception for compliance personnel to obtain
standing. Alternatively, if not eliminating the reasonable time exception
altogether, the certainty issues noted above may be resolved by replacing
the language in the rule requiring disclosure with language requiring
internal corrective action of the violation.264
Fourth, the proposed rules bar culpable parties convicted of a related
criminal violation from obtaining whistleblower bounties. While
appropriately recognizing that culpable parties should not have standing,
the rules should go further to exclude other culpable parties. 265 Parties that
are complicit in wrongdoing for failing to follow internal control
procedures or reporting known fraud should also be considered culpable
and therefore ineligible for whistleblower bounties.
266
Alternatively, corporations should be permitted to require internal
reporting and bring counterclaims against whistleblowers violating such
policies.26 7 As complicity to fraud can be culpable behavior itself, an
important tool for corporations to prevent fraud is ethics codes requiring
employees to serve a gatekeeping function and report bad conduct.268 It
could be unnecessarily difficult for corporations to enforce internal
compliance systems if they cannot require ethical conduct from
employees. 69 Critics argue that culpable parties often have the most
significant and relevant information. 270 Nonetheless, the proposed rules
262 David Gauthier-Villars, Police Probe If Renault was Victim in Spy Case, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article-email/SB1000142405274870
4027504576198924136741318-IMyQjAxMTAxMDEwNDExNDQyWj.html.
263 Sebastian Moffett & David Pearson, Renault Apologizes to Fired Employees,
WALL ST. J. Mar. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052
748704893604576200320262843698-lMyQjAxMTAxMDEwNDExNDQyWj.
html.
264 Public Comments from Karrie McMillan, Investment Company Institute, to
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 9 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-139.pdf.
265 Public Comments from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, to Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 3 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/
s7-33-1 0/s73310-200.pdf.
266 id.
267 Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1843-44.
26 Id. at 1844.
269 id.
270 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70517 (Nov. 17, 2010). See
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sh6uld be amended to define culpable parties to include whistleblowers
who do not follow internal controls procedures.
Fifth, the proposed rules require that whistleblowers are the "original
source" of information in a similar manner to the False Claims Act. 7
More specifically, the rule should require that whistleblowers be the
primary source of information. Until 2009, the FCA required that
whistleblowers be the primary source of information.272
Poor policy results without a primary source requirement because the
rule could be construed as going beyond what Dodd-Frank requires and
creating an affirmative duty to report. In some cases it may be difficult for
employees who do not wish to report to avoid telling third parties. For
example, employees may seek advice about reporting from fellow
employees (i.e., third parties). As such, some employees with information
may need to report the fraud to avoid exploitation from third party
whistleblowers. Even well-intentioned third parties may effectively
implicate the primary source employee and compromise anonymity when
only a select few individuals have access to reported information.
Alternatively, employees fearing such exploitation may be deterred from
seeking advice about reporting from fellow employees.
Going further to reinforce a primary source requirement, the SEC
should limit standing to employees and those in contractual privity with the
wrongdoer (e.g. business partners and vendors).273 Employees and parties
in contractual privity with the wrongdoer, in contrast to outsiders, should be
eligible for bounties because their relationship to a wrongdoer puts them in
a position to obtain inside information and their professional
responsibilities do not necessarily compel disclosure.274
The story of one professional whistleblower heeds a cautionary tale.275
Professional whistleblower Joe Piacentile ("Dr. Joe")2 76 and his attorneys 277
also Bronner, supra note 75 (noting that whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld did not
receive an award under the IRS bounty program for reporting UBS AG tax fraud
because he was a culpable party).
271 Bronner, supra note 75, at 18 n.21.
272 id.
273 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842-43 (2010). In contrast, the
SEC's proposed rules limitstanding by defining the term "independent knowledge,"
which is required for a bounty, to except information obtained by certain persons or
in certain situations. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provision of Section 21 F, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70492.
274S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110 (2009).
275 Kolz, supra note 107.
276 Mr. Piacentile is known as "Dr. Joe" by the qui tam bar. Id.
277 Id. (noting that many lawyers from the "relatively clubby" qui tam bar have
represented Dr. Joe).
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have amassed a small fortune making FCA claims based on information
obtained from private investigations.78 To obtain information, Dr. Joe
often poses as a business partner or employee.279 While Dr. Joe sometimes
obtains and reports information leading to an award, the overwhelming
majority of his tips do not lead to enforcement actions.28° In light of Dr.
Joe's often poor but nonetheless frequent tips, he imposes unnecessary
costs on businesses unaware of his misrepresentations and on agencies
conducting fraud investigations.
Public policy should not support granting professional whistleblowers
standing to obtain bounties. Investigations should not be outsourced to
professional whistleblowers because agencies are presumably better
investigators due to experience, resource availability and reasonable
compensation (i.e., do not require whistleblower bounties). Dodd-Frank
outsources enforcement to whistleblowers only under the assumption that
2811
whistleblowers are in a better position to obtain relevant information.
Put simply, professional whistleblowers do not support Dodd-Frank's
policy objectives because they are not naturally in a better position to obtain
material inside information than existing government agencies.
Another consideration is that professional whistleblowers may cause
whistleblower awards to be shared and detract from the awards of more
legitimate whistleblowers 82 One strategy employed by Dr. Joe is to obtain
vague information and strive to be the first whistleblower to report fraud.
By doing so, Dr. Joe can "piggyback" on information provided by other
whistleblowers even if his information, standing alone, would not have
been sufficient to lead to an enforcement action. Although Dr. Joe is a rare
instance of a professional whistleblower and many of the specifics of his
tips are left under seal, his story illustrates the need to narrow
whistleblower standing to avoid mischief.
As a corollary to the primary source requirement, the proposed rules
properly require that whistleblowers report non-publicly available
283information to be eligible for a bounty. An exemption for independent
analysis of publicly available information strikes an appropriate balance for
this requirement.284  Harry Markopolous' analysis of publicly available
information, for example, would still be eligible for an award. Finally, the
278 Dr. Joe has made at least $17 million in whistleblower awards. Id.
2 79 Id.
280 id.
281 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2009).
282 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(j), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See also Kolz, supra note 107
(stating that the FCA requires relator bounties to be awarded as a group).
283 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 2 IF,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70492 (Nov. 17, 2010).284 id.
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proposed rules do not grant foreign officials standing to receive a
whistleblower bounty in recognition of foreign sovereignty.285
Accordingly, changes should be made to the standing requirements under
the proposed rules.
3. "Pleading" with Particularity
A heightened pleading/reporting standard should be incorporated into
the definition of original information such that tips providing incomplete
information or mere hunches will not lead to an award. Indeed, the SEC's
proposed rules provide some guidance to whistleblowers as to what
requirements must be met to earn a bounty.2 86 The proposed rules require
that whistleblowers: cause the SEC to open an investigation; provide
information "significantly contributing" to the success of the enforcement
action; and provide evidence which will "lead to a successful enforcement
action. 2 87
However, the proposed rules should be more restrictive. A heightened
pleading/reporting standard should require whistleblowers to identify
culpable individuals, plead any required level of scienter, explain where the
fraud occurred and explain the specific behavior constituting fraud.2 18 If
not adopting a per se standing bar, as suggested above, professional
plaintiffs could be deterred by limiting the number of permissible
whistleblower complaints. Other restrictions may include staying discovery
pending administrative review of pleading/reporting requirements or
requiring whistleblowers to provide specific types of reliable evidence.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous laws adopt a
heightened pleading standard to prove fraud in federal court and should
extend to the whistleblower reporting context.289 In the securities litigation
context, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PLSRA") is
designed to limit frivolous strike suits that place an undue burden on
290businesses. Specifically, the PSLRA: requires that plaintiffs plead with
285 Id. at 70502.
286 Id. at 70497.
287 Id. It should be noted that there are circumstances where a whistleblower bounty
is available even though the tip did not cause an investigation to begin, but such
information is held to a higher standard. Id. at 70498.
2" FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See also Stradford v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 02 CIV.
3628(NRB), 2002 WL 31027517, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002) (noting that
"FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that the time, place, and nature of the [alleged]
misrepresentations be disclosed to the party accused of fraud").
289 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
290 H.R. REP. No. 104-50 (1995). Strike suits may emerge in the securities
litigation context due to plaintiff's lawyers, more so than angry shareholders,
seeking to capitalize on falling stock prices. Corporations are often willing to settle
strike suits because they are risk averse and they wish to avoid costs of litigation
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particularity that defendants acted with a particular state of mind;29' limits
plaintiffs to five securities class action cases within a three year period; and
stays discovery pending motions to dismiss.192 With strike suits in mind, it
is reasonable to extend heightened pleading/reporting as a requirement for
whistleblower bounties because pleading with particularity is required to
enforce the securities laws in federal court and therefore necessary for the
SEC to measurably benefit from tips. 293 Elsewhere, qui tam actions brought
by whistleblowers under the FCA, a similar context, require heightened
pleading.2 94 Within Dodd-Frank, heightened pleading is invoked for claims
295
against credit rating agencies.
From a policy standpoint, heightened pleading is efficient to limit many
costs of the bounty program. First, frivolous tips based upon hunches or
without evidence may be deterred as clearly outside the scope of the bounty
program. Second, whistleblowers may be incentivized to gather and
provide more complete information before reporting fraud, which will
reduce agency investigatory costs. Third, companies accused of fraud will
be in a better position to defend against whistleblower claims because they
will have a better understanding of the fraud allegations against them.296
Bounties should therefore be awarded only to those whistleblowers
reporting fraud allegations with particularity.
4. Deterring Frivolous Tips with Risk Exposure
Whistleblowers and attorneys should be exposed to risk to deter
unreliable tips. 297 Giving attorneys or whistleblowers "skin in the game'
298
and associated reputational harm. Id. Moreover, courts are often willing to
approve settlements to clear complicated cases from their dockets. Id. Similar
circumstances may arise with whistleblowers reporting securities fraud. Public
Comments from Jack Jordan, to Proposed Rules for Implementing the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
at 2-8 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
198.pdf.
291 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec.
101(b), § 21D(b)(1)(B)(2), 109 Stat. 737, 747, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995).
291 Id. at sec. 10 1(b), § 27(b).
293 The SEC uses a similar line of reasoning to justify a whistleblower's evidentiary
burden. See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of
Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70497 (Nov.
17, 2010).
294 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., et al., 98 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 2000).
295 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 933(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1883-84 (2010).
296 Stradford v. Zurich Insurance Company, 2002 WL 31027517, at *4 (noting that
"the 'primary purpose' of Rule 9(b) is to afford a litigant accused of fraud fair
notice of the claim and the factual ground upon which it is based.").
297 Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1850.
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may deter unreliable tips made by employees reporting mere hunches about
fraud, employees defensively seeking statutory whistleblower protection
and employees retaliating against supervisors for perceived slights. 299 In
turn; exposure to risk will ease the SEC's management burden while
preserving the benefits of whistleblower incentives.
Dbodd-Frank, as supported by the proposed rules, indirectly places
attorneys at risk for frivolous tip submissions under the SEC's Rules of
Practice by requiring that anonymous whistleblowers retain an attorney.0 0
Attorneys must essentially perform a screening function to avoid
representing whistleblowers making frivolous tips, which could subject
them to sanctions under the SEC Rules of Practice.30 1 The resultant cost on
attorneys is appropriate because, as noted above, trial attorneys benefit from
the bounty program insomuch as they earn fees representing whistleblowers
and advising businesses.302 In light of this benefit, attorneys gain little
sympathy over screening expenses they choose to incur by representing
securities law whistleblowers. For similar reasons, the PLSRA subjects
attorneys to "sanctions for abusive litigation.', 30 3 In the present context, the
SEC should write a rule outlining specific attorney sanctions for abusive
whistleblower claims. Moreover, it may be appropriate to cap attorneys'
fees for SEC whistleblowers to further discourage unreliable tips.
3 4
Whistleblowers, in contrast to attorneys, are currently exposed to little
litigation risk as a result of the bounty program. In fact, the only statutory
penalty for reporting intentionally unreliable tips is inconsequential
298 Telephone Interview with Dan Sandman, supra note 165.
299 Id. See also e.g., Kolz, supra note 107.
300 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70501 (Nov. 17, 2010)
(stating that attorneys may face sanction under SEC Rules of Practice for
misconduct while practicing before the SEC). See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), § 21 F(d)(2).
301 But see Public Comments from Jack Jordan, supra note 290, at 8 (stating that
the SEC does not sufficiently scrutinize frivolous statements by whistleblower
attorneys). But see Public Comments from Eric Dixon, Esq., to Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21 F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/
s7-33-10/s73310-221 .pdf (stating that attorneys must perform a screening function
to represent whistleblowers).
302 See supra Pt.IV.
303 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1.
304 But see Public Comments from C. Gibson Vance, President, American
Association for Justice, to Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 2-3 (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-132.pdf (arguing that
access to attorneys is critical for whistleblowers to report fraud).
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ineligibility for whistleblower awards.0 5 Nonetheless, there may still be
some risk as the Department of Justice has indicated that it will prosecute
fabricated whistleblower tips.
30 6
Fee-shifting may deter frivolous tips. Under the "American bounty
hunter" system, plaintiffs are free to bring claims without exposure to the
risk they will be responsible for the defendant's attorneys' fees if their
action is unsuccessful. 30 7 By comparison, a rule adopting the English fee-
shifting system in which a litigation loser pays the winner's legal fees
would subject whistleblowers to risk. With fee-shifting, whistleblowers
may be reluctant to make unreliable claims because they face monetary
penalties.30 s As a result, the SEC would reduce the burden of handling
some unreliable tips.
Candidly, issues arise surrounding a risk-based system. First,
whistleblowers concerned that their tips will be characterized as frivolous
and result in liability may be reluctant to file valid claims. Nonetheless,
creating an objective and high standard for fraud will provide certainty and
limit the risk of deterring reliable whistleblowers claims due to a fear of
penalties. Second, whistleblowers may already be exposed to sufficient risk
due to the career-risk involved with reporting if there is no anonymous
method of reporting.309 However, career risk does not deter whistleblowers
who defensively make claims to avoid otherwise justified workplace
penalties, which may appear to be retaliatory when applied to a
whistleblower.
In a similar context, Congress implemented fee-shifting provisions for
qui tam actions brought under the False Claims Act.310 Under the FCA, the
defendant's legal fees are shifted to the whistleblower 3 if the suit is
"clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious or brought primarily for purposes of
305 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), §
21F(i).
306 Yin Wilczek, DOJ to Prosecute Whistleblowers Who Fabricate Information,
Bharara Says, in BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Nov. 15, 2010).
307 Professor Dale Oesterle, J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law, Class Lecture in Law 607.01L: Business
Associations, Feb. 22, 2010.
308 Telephone Interview with Dan Sandman, supra note 165. But see Kovacic,
supra note 16, at 1850 n. 185 (noting that there is debate over whether fee-shifting
deters frivolous suits).
309 Cavico, supra note 169, at 545 ("practical, ethical and legal ramifications
[make] blowing the whistle one of the most difficult decisions an employee will
have to make").
310 Kovacic, supra note 16 at 1850 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1994)).
31 Persons reporting illegal activity are referred to as "relators" rather than
"whistleblowers" under the False Claims Act. See Kovacic, supra note 16.
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harassment., 312 Although the high standard has resulted in few defendants
successfully shifting fees to whistleblowers, 3 the presence of FCA fee-
shifting may still deter frivolous claims and there appear to be few costs
associated with the FCA fee-shifting rule. A rule subjecting attorneys or
whistleblowers to risk should be adopted due to the considerable benefits of
deterring unreliable tips and nominal costs.
5. Proper Scope ofAnti-Retaliation Protection
The SEC has provided little guidance to implement Dodd-Frank's anti-
retaliation provisions. The proposed rules state only that whistleblowers do
not need to meet the procedures and conditions for a bounty to have anti-
retaliation protection.314 Although critics argue that whistleblowers should
not benefit from anti-relation protection if not eligible for a bounty,315
separate qualifications for anti-retaliation and bounty program eligibility are
appropriate to protect whistleblowers from uncertainty about anti-retaliation
protection. Furthermore, separate standards justify higher standards for
bounty program eligibility because ineligibility only revokes opportunity
for a windfall gain. In sum, Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provisions should
be independent of bounty program eligibility.
C. Novel Rule Proposals
1. Bounties for Only Certain Types of Securities Fraud
Dodd-Frank is designed to address problems with U.S. capital
markets 316 and its whistleblower provisions are specifically intended to
address notorious Ponzi schemes.317 A broad whistleblower program
incentivizing whistleblowers to report all securities fraud therefore goes
beyond the scope of Dodd-Frank's policy objectives. By incentivizing
tangentially related fraud, some whistleblower reports will have abstract
benefits but nonetheless incur heavy costs. 3 18 For example, whistleblowers
reporting violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions will only
3 121d. at 1850 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1994)).
313 id
314 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70489 (Nov. 17, 2010).
315 Wilczek, supra note 211.
316 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2-4 (2009).
317 Id. at 110.
318 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 2 IF,
75 Fed. Reg. at 70516.
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indirectly protect U.S. capital markets, but nonetheless impose costs on
businesses and the SEC.319
To address Dodd-Frank's policy anomaly, the SEC should define
"original information" in such a way that reporting only the type of
securities fraud that Dodd-Frank was intended to address would warrant a
whistleblower award. Past securities legislation has avoided this oddity by
tailoring whistleblower bounty programs to the specific fraud they were
meant to deter. For example, the Insider Trading and Securities
Enforcement Act of 1988 was enacted in response to insider trading
scandals and accordingly instituted a bounty program limited to insider
trading.320
Legislative history clearly shows that original information is intended
to mean "new" or "novel.,' 321 However, in addition to new or novel, rules
may be written to interpret original information as also meaning "origin" or
"beginning, ' 322 as in the origins of the financial crisis Dodd-Frank is
intended to address.323  Applying this interpretation, a rule could limit
whistleblower bounties to novel reports of structured finance fraud, Ponzi
schemes or financial reporting under the FCPA and SOX 404. Although
the SEC has indicated that they have authority to define the scope of Dodd-
Frank through rulemaking, 324 a rule adopting this interpretation could be
overruled even by courts applying Chevron deference on the ground that it
is not consistent with legislative intent or against Dodd-Frank's plain
325
meaning.
3 19 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Oil and Gas Bribery Case Settled for $236 Million,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/business/globaU/
05bribe.html?ref=-business.320 The existing SEC insider trading bounty program was enacted in response to
scandals at Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. and other banks. H. REP. No. 100-910,
at 12 (1988).
321 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 111 (2009).
322 Definition of Original, FREE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/original (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
323 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2-4. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872
(2010).
324 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21 F,
Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70514-15 (Nov. 17, 2010).
But see id. at 70515-16 ("[M]any of the key elements of the whistleblower
program have been established by the statute.").
325 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under the Chevron doctrine, administrative rules are upheld if they are: (1)
consistent with congressional intent; and (2) reasonable. Id. at 842-43. As applied
to the present case, the interpretation would probably be considered reasonable in
light of administrative expertise and political accountability. Id. at 834-44.
However, there may be an issue as to whether interpreting original information as
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Regardless, a rule limiting the type of fraud within the bounty program
is a potential way to deter tips about unrelated fraud. Moreover, it is a way
for the SEC to pursue an enforcement strategy based upon their
independent judgment. If the SEC elects to pursue an independent
enforcement strategy by simply ignoring whistleblower tips, they are
subject to criticism though Dodd-Frank's mandate for an Inspector General
Report.326 A rule limiting the scope of the bounty program is therefore
appropriate.
2. Dollar Value Bounty Caps/Floors and Non-Pooled Bounties
Dodd-Frank encompasses policy objectives to provide certainty to
whistleblowers and presumably strives to do so in a cost-effective manner
as well.327 However, as noted above, the required 10-30% bounty may not
provide certainty as intended or, even if doing so, may not be cost-
effective.3 28 To remedy these concerns, the SEC should implement a rule
guaranteeing bounties within a stated dollar range regardless of whether
other whistleblowers earn awards as well.
Addressing the marginal utility of large monetary whistleblower
incentives, Senator Kyl proposed a $5-20 million cap on whistleblower
bounties on the Senate floor.329 Sen. Kyl reasoned that bounties above a
high dollar amount are not likely to incentivize additional reporting because
bounties may be virtually indistinguishable to most whistleblowers. 330 In
response to Sen. Kyl, Sen. Leahy noted legislative deference to
discretionary judicial approval of whistleblower bounties to refute such a
cap.33 ' However, the judiciary does not have discretion to impose a cap
below ten percent of enforcement proceeds due to statutory restrictions.
Moreover, any floor on whistleblower bounties necessarily limits
administrative discretion. 332 Thus, the ten percent floor may not be cost-
effective if there is little marginal utility and Congress should adopt dollar
value caps on whistleblower bounties.
"origin" is against congressional intent. Specifically, the text and legislative
history establish that original information means "new" or "novel," but it is not
clear whether the "origin" interpretation is inconsistent with the "new" or "novel"
interpretation.
326 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(d).
327 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110 (2009).
328 See supra Pt.III.B.
329 CONG. REC. S4611 (Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
330 Id. It should also be noted that whistleblowers may not be aware of whether
their reporting will result in a successful enforcement action and thus do not have
an accurate estimation of a potential award. See e.g., Wyatt, supra note 53.
331 CONG. REC. S4517 (Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
332 See id.
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Moreover, the required whistleblower bounty range will only provide
whistleblowers with certainty if they know that the award will not be
pooled and split among multiple whistleblowers, as Dodd-Frank allows.333
To provide certainty, a rule should be written foregoing pooled bounties.
334
An obvious criticism to this approach is that bounties may be exorbitant and
even exceed penalties collected. However, this result can be curtailed or
avoided by adopting high reporting standards through rulemaking, as
suggested above. Further, the certainty provided to whistleblowers may
justify this counterintuitive result if only occurring in rare instances. In a
similar context, test cases pursued by the SEC have justified excessive costs
in individual cases to benefit the overall enforcement strategy.
Accordingly, rules are necessary to provide whistleblowers with certainty
and, in the aggregate, SEC rulemaking can address Dodd-Frank's likely
costs moving forward.
VI. BusiNEss COMPLIANCE
Employees uncovering fraud must balance a duty to society with
organizational loyalty.335 Dodd-Frank is designed to tip the scales in favor
of a duty to society by offering whistleblowers substantial bounties for
reliable tips. 336  In pursuit of this goal, however, Dodd-Frank also
encourages employees to promptly report fraud externally to win the race to
secure a bounty.337 As such, the essence of Dodd-Frank's whistleblower
provisions complicates business compliance. Notwithstanding any efforts
to influence administrative rulemaking through public comment or
legislative action through lobbying, businesses can promote compliance by
taking steps: (1) to prevent fraud and encourage internal detection; (2) to
avoid whistleblower retaliation once fraud has been detected; and (3) to
comply specifically with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). 338
333 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
334 But see Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provision of
Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70499 (Nov.
17, 2010).
335 MILTON SNOEYENBOS ET AL., BusINESS ETHICs 388-89 (3d ed. 2001). See also
ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS AND WHY 27
(2003).
336 S. REP. No. 111-176, at 111 (2009). See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1)(A).
337 Carton, supra note 82.
338 This section is designed to be a general overview of steps to comply with
internal control requirements and avoid whistleblower retaliation liability, which
may be contingent on a particular jurisdiction's law. For a more in-depth
discussion and analysis, see DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10:1; Donald
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A. Preventative Measures and Internal Detection
Management systems should be in place to encourage and manage
internal fraud reporting in a way that limits potential liability. Training is
also,.necessary to notify employees of wrongful behavior and procedures
should be available to report corporate wrongdoing internally.339 As
empjoyees are often reluctant to report fraud due to uncertainty regarding
potential retaliation and condemnation by their peers,34 ° knowledge of
prohibited activity and reporting procedures may encourage employees to
report fraud internally.
34
'
Prohibited wrongful conduct in a code of conduct should include
retaliation against employees reporting fraud.342 Other prohibited conduct
may include: "insider trading, environmental crimes, bribery/payment
violations, intellectual property infractions, accounting improprieties,
discrimination/harassment and other offenses." 34 3 With regard to
procedure, employees should be permitted to report fraud to particular
individuals who can report retaliation complaints. 344 Hotlines may also be
implemented for employees to anonymously or confidentially report
fraud.345
Businesses should review their internal controls to prevent fraud and
encourage internal reporting if fraud does occur.34 Proper internal controls
and communication systems can serve as "a corporate safety net" against
fraud and render whistleblowing virtually unnecessary.3 47 In fact,
C. Dowling, Jr., International HR Best Practice Tips: Conducting Internal
Employee Investigation Outside the U.S., 19 INT'L HR J. 1, 2 (2006).
339 DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10.1.
340 Frank Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L.
REV. 545, 546-47 (2004).
341 Dowling, Jr., supra note 338, at 2-3.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10.1. Such individuals may include
"designated managers, in-house counsel and/or human resources personnel." Id.
345 Dowling, supra note 338, at 2.
346 FREDERICK ELLISTON ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING 135 (1985) (stating that external
fraud reporting can "embarrass the company by washing their dirty laundry in
public). See also Competition, Antitrust & White-Collar Crime and Business
Litigation Update: Dodd-Frank Expands Securities Whistleblower Incentives,
THOMPSON HINE LLP (July 30, 2010), http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/
4ublication2134.html.
7 Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowing as corporate safety net, in GERALD VINTEN,
WHISTLEBLOWING: SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 25 (1994).
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companies have been relatively successful in defending against SOX
whistleblower retaliation claims.348
In addition, employers should maintain performance records about
employees.349 If an employee is disciplined or terminated after reporting
wrongdoing, the employer may be able to successfully defend against
employee retaliation claims.350 With poor performance records prior to
fraud reporting, employers may cast doubt on a causal link between
disciplinary measures and reporting.35'
B. Avoiding Whistleblower Retaliation
Procedures should be in place and management should be trained to
prevent retaliation against employees reporting fraud.352 Under Dodd-
Frank, even employees reporting unauthenticated fraud are protected
against retaliation and employers should avoid any appearance of
whistleblower retaliation.353 Procedures should be designed to retain
management rights such that a reporting employee is no better or worse off
as a result of reporting.354 Employers must therefore balance retaining
management rights and avoiding whistleblower liability.
Once wrongdoing or fraud has been reported, it is critical to swiftly
respond. Misconduct must be discontinued 355 and immediate discipline
should be implemented if fraud or other misconduct is clear.356 Moreover,
the employee allegedly engaging in fraud should be counseled about proper
behavior.357 If the reporting employee so desires, s/he should be separated
from working alongside the employee engaging in alleged misconduct.
358
Furthermore, every effort must be made to confidentially communicate
with all the parties involved, including the reporting employee, the
employee engaging in alleged misconduct and any witnesses. Initially,
involved employees should be notified of investigation procedures and
assured that communication is confidential, where appropriate.359
348 DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10.1.
349 Id.
350 id
351 Id.352 DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10:2.
3 53 id.
354 Id.
355 Dowling, supra note 338, at 6.356 Id. at 2.
357 DELIKAT & PHILLIPS, supra note 127, § 10:2.
358 Id. Measures should be taken to ensure that the employee does not consider any
change in working conditions to be retaliatory in nature. ld359 Id. For each instance of reported fraud, it is important to appoint an
investigation team, define the scope of the investigation (i.e., legal and factual
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Management should check in periodically with the reporting employee
during the investigation to ask about any retaliation concerns.36 ° Other
witnesses should be notified of the investigation and given Upjohn
warnings, which explain that the attorney works for the employer
corporation and may have corresponding confidentiality obligations.361
Yet another safeguard is accumulating and maintaining records after
fraud has been reported. To prepare for potential litigation, records about
the alleged fraud and the involved employees should be accumulated.362
Internal and external auditors should be consulted to ensure that financial
statements are accurate despite any hidden losses or inappropriate
363payments. For example, and as addressed in the next section, inaccurate
financial reporting may increase the volume of FCPA violations.
C. Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Siemens AG
Compliance with the FCPA, which prohibits bribery365 and requires
maintaining reasonable records,366 is increasingly important in today's
regulatory environment. First, the SEC has adopted an enforcement
strategy which prioritizes FCPA enforcement.367 Second, it is expected that
Dodd-Frank will incentivize many tips regarding violations of the FCPA to
spur SEC enforcement.368 Third, companies driven to engage in illegal
activity to remain competitive during the recent economic crisis may
increase the volume of FCPA violations.369
Necessarily, then, businesses must implement internal controls to
comply with the FCPA.37 ° Of particular importance are policies that
issues to be investigated) and draft an investigation plan outlining steps to be taken.
Id. at 3.360 Id. § 10:2. If the reporting employee has valid retaliation concerns, prompt
remedial action should be taken. Id.
361 Dowling, supra note 338, at 4 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981)).
362 Id.
363 Id. at 5.
364 id.
365 Philip H. Hilder, Hilder & Associates PC, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Compliance Issues: Leading Lawyers on Responding to Recent FCPA Enforcement
Actions, Maintaining an Effective Compliance Program, and Navigating Risk in
Emerging Markets, 2010 WL 2828307, at *5 (July 2010).
366 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). See also Hilder, supra note 365, at 6.
367 Chi, supra note 129. See also Lowman, supra note 145, at 4.
368 Harker et al., supra note 34. See also Carton, supra note 82; Reisinger, supra
note 44.
369 Lowman, supra note 145, at 5.
370 Wilczek, supra note 84.
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specifically forbid acts prohibited by the FCPA371 and training employees
about such prohibited activity.372 With respect to financial reporting,
internal controls should be in place to ensure that transactions are
authorized, monitored if deemed to be high risk, properly recorded and in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.37 3 If there is any
doubt regarding whether a particular activity complies with the FCPA, the
Department of Justice is available to review the proposed conduct and
provide an opinion on legality.
Monitoring can be an effective tool to detect illegal activity and avoid
or limit FCPA liability.374 Internal audits involving a team of forensic
auditors including outside counsel can be an effective fraud detection
strategy.375  Further, risk assessment should be performed, especially
regarding consultants, agents, distributors and subcontractors working in
countries with a history of corruption.376 Similarly, due diligence of third
parties should be performed before entering into international mergers,
acquisitions or joint ventures.377 If all else fails and FCPA violations are
detected, companies should strongly consider self-reporting violations to
potentially curb liability.378  Self-reporting may produce leniency and
prevent the fraud from becoming a larger problem.
379
Reformed practices at Siemens AG, an international electronics and
electrical engineering firm, demonstrate proper FCPA compliance. In
2008, Siemens plead guilty and settled civil charges regarding longstanding
criminal violations of the FCPA's internal controls and books/records
provisions.8 With "crisis" looming, Siemens response to these violations
371 Lowman, supra note 145, at 9 (noting that recent FCPA enforcement actions
have resulted in senior management being liable for FCPA violations they did not
know were illegal despite the presence of a corporate policy forbidding such
conduct). See also Hilder, supra note 365, at 7. Such activity should clearly
outline permissible corporate payments for gifts and entertainment. Id. at 8.
372 Lowman, supra note 145, at 9. See also Hilder, supra note 365, at 7.
373 Hilder, supra note 365, at 6.
3 74 
id.
375 Lowman, supra note 145, at 9-10.
376 id.
377 Id. at 8. See also Hinchey, supra note 80; Rebekah J. Poston et al., FCPA Due
Diligence in Acquisitions, 43 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 13, 14 (Jan. 20,
2010).
378 Wilczek, supra note 84. But see Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 233, at 183-84
(noting that some companies may rationally choose to resolve issues internally
rather than self-report).
379 Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 233, at 183-212.
380 Press Release No. 08-11-5, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Siemens AG and Three
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm- 1105.html. Subsidiaries
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has allowed it to maintain a competitive global presence.3 8' During the
crisis, Siemens spent an estimated $1 billion to conduct an extensive
investigation into the violations and comply with law enforcement.382 Once
the violations were resolved, Siemens instituted a world-class compliance
system consistent with the recommendations in this section.38 3 Specifically,
Siemens now has extensive internal controls (e.g. proper approval and
reporting of transactions), conducts employee and management training,
conducts extensive due diligence of business partners, provides a tip line for
employees to report fraud and also a hotline to answer employee
compliance questions. 8  Coming full circle, the 2009 Dow Jones
Sustainability Index bestowed its top rating upon Siemens in the "Codes of
Conduct/Compliance" category. 3 85 Like Siemens, other businesses should
implement practices to properly manage existing fraud and avoid or limit
liability resulting from Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2000 page Dodd-Frank Act enacts sweeping changes to our
financial regulatory system including provisions that provide
whistleblowers with anti-retaliation protection and monetary incentives to
report securities fraud.386 Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly in light of
the sheer length of Dodd-Frank, there is little indication in the legislative
history of Dodd-Frank that Congress objectively considered whistleblower
motives, incentives and the negative implications which may result.
387
Moving forward, negative implications should be remedied with agency
management and rulemaking, legislative amendment and internal business
policies and controls.3 8
also admitted violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Id. See also Press
Release No. 2008-294, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide
Bribery, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
381 See Jack Ewing, Siemens Posts $1.9 Billion Quarterly Profit, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/business/global/30iht-
siemens.html?ref=siemensag. But see Altman Granitsas, Greece Targets Siemens
Over Bribe Scandal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052748704698004576103481318124252.html?mod=WSJ business wha
tsNews (noting that Siemens may still face penalties outside the U.S.).
382 Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 233, at 209.
383 2 Compliance Report, SIEMENs AG 25 (2009).
384 Id. at 25-27.3851 d. at 27.
386 See infra Pt.II.B.
387 But see S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 244 (2009).
388 See infra Pt.IV-VI.
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Against this background, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions
demonstrate a risk inherent in long legislation encompassing broad
substantive areas. Expressly, broadly reaching legislation may result in
less-than-thoughtful legislation and undesirable policy that is difficult to
amend. To be sure, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions will impose
costs on businesses and agencies and benefit trial lawyer interests.389 What
are less certain are the benefits to society-namely confidence in the U.S.
capital markets. 390 Therefore, while only time will tell whether the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower provisions fulfill their policy ends39 1, lawmakers
should be cognizant of the risks inherent with long and broadly reaching
legislation.
389 See supra Pt. III.B.
390 See supra Pt. III.A. The SEC posits that whistleblower bounty program costs
are outweighed by the confidence they create in U.S. capital markets by deterring
fraud, which consequently incentives investing. Proposed Rules for Implementing
the Whistleblower Provision of Section 21F, Exch. Act Release No. 34-63237, 75
Fed. Reg. 70488 (Nov. 17, 2010).
391 See e.g., Harker et al., supra note 34, at 7779-80 ("[T]he program could be a
boon to law enforcement in connection with laws such as the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act"). It is expected that agencies will be heavily lobbied as they write
rules and regulations to implement Dodd-Frank. Amanda Becker, Financial
overhaul has been signed, but lawyers' work on law isfarfrom over, WASH. POST,
July 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/
AR2010072304359.html; Ronald D. Oral, Bank lobbyist expects 'mistakes'with
new rules, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
bank-lobbyist-expects-mistakes-with-new-rules-2010-10-14, (stating that short
time horizons to write the rules implementing Dodd-Frank may result in
administrative rulemaking mistakes).
